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Epigraph 
 
 
 
“… to live finely is not the same as the things without which living finely is impossible. And in the 
latter class of things some that are indispensable conditions of health and life are not peculiar to 
special people but common to practically all…” 
- Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 
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Introduction 
Health is the Ability to Act 
 
This thesis is about what it means to be healthy. It proceeds from a relatively simple idea: 
that whether a person is healthy depends on whether they have certain characteristically human 
abilities, such as the ability to communicate with other people, or the ability to move from one place 
to another. This view contrasts with the traditional conception of “health” as a kind of physiological 
and mental state.1 Rather than thinking of health as something that the body can have or not, then, I 
conceive of “health” as a set of abilities to act. When we want to determine whether a person is 
healthy, we look first at what they can actually do, and then examine how their anatomy and 
physiology contribute, instead of the other way around. In summary, capability precedes physiology in my 
account of health. 
In reworking the concept of “health,” I hope to provide a new perspective for thinking 
about healthcare. In particular, I propose that healthcare should focus primarily on ensuring that 
each person meets a minimum level of ability for certain crucial day-to-day activities. I call these 
everyday abilities basic bodily capabilities. Some of the basic bodily capabilities, such as breathing, 
sleeping, and getting nourishment from food, are utterly essential to our survival. Other of the 
capabilities, such as imagination, planning, and cooperation, are not strictly necessary for survival, 
yet they serve a central role in virtually any self-sufficient human life. By orienting our clinicians and 
healthcare institutions towards promoting capabilities – rather than simply checking that the 
patient’s physiological variables fall within normal ranges, and reactively prescribing medicine and 																																																								1	To cite the definition of health famously articulated in the preamble to the constitution of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), “health is a state of complete physical, social and mental well-being, and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity” (my emphasis; Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization, 1946). 
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lifestyle changes when these variables deviate from the norm – I believe that we can improve the 
overall quality of healthcare. 
Nowadays, the goals and objectives of healthcare are manifold and often opaque. Some 
healthcare professionals earnestly seek to promote their patients’ wellbeing. Others seek simply to 
practice according to standards of care. Others yet work tirelessly to get patients out of their ER, 
office, or clinic. The motives of our healthcare institutions – medical and nursing schools, insurance 
companies, hospitals – are even more diverse, and sometimes more obscure. Yet, in this cacophony 
of competing interests, the goals and needs of patients are often lost or ignored. This patient-neglect 
is troublesome because the healthcare industry consists fundamentally of providers of a service. In 
exchange for money, healthcare institutions provide people with medical procedures, drugs, and 
expertise in order to help these people promote their health and ameliorate disease. According to 
our lay conceptions of economics, the providers of a service should be accountable to the desires, 
needs, and values of their customers, or else they should fail to make money and eventually cease to 
exist. In our current situation, however, healthcare providers can get away with ignoring or 
downplaying their customers’ (i.e., their patients’) wants and needs, because our healthcare 
institutions – medical schools, nursing schools, accrediting and licensing agencies, hospitals, 
professional organizations – have a monopoly on the knowledge, skill, and legal authorization 
necessary to provide medical treatment. Moreover, healthcare is not economically elastic: we cannot 
simply refuse to seek treatment when illness befalls us; our instinct for self-preservation spurs us to 
purchase healthcare services from these particular providers. Together, the inelasticity of healthcare and 
the intellectual and legal monopoly of our current healthcare institutions contribute to a system with 
the potential to exploit.  
Of course, merely redefining “health” and “disease” will not solve the legal and economic 
aspects of these problems. Our healthcare institutions will not likely lose their monopoly on the 
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right and ability to provide healthcare in the near future: and, indeed, we would not want to allow 
just anyone to practice medicine, nor would we want to allow just any medical or nursing school to 
educate students. And the economic inelasticity of healthcare will never go away. It is the result of 
the fact that we are fragile, finite beings with a will to survive. However, we may be able to 
discourage or safeguard against exploitation by promoting medical concepts that emphasize patients’ 
goals and values. I believe that my account of “health” as basic bodily capability accomplishes this task. 
I have aimed for my basic bodily capabilities to form an “overlapping consensus among people who 
have very different comprehensive conceptions of the good” (Nussbaum 2000, 5). That is to say, I 
have crafted a list of basic bodily capabilities that I believe virtually any adult would see as desirable, 
regardless of their unique values and life goals. 
Ultimately, patient goals and purposes make up the normative backbone of my account of 
“health” and “disease.” As providers of a service, healthcare institutions have a responsibility to their 
customers’, i.e., their patients’ wants and needs. Perhaps more importantly, however, each 
individual’s personal goals and values are what make life worth living for him or her, what make 
anything worth doing. Since “health” is that which enables us to use our bodies to do the things we 
want to do, and since purposes are what make these activities worthwhile, purposes are what make 
health worth having. 
 
Philosophical Aims 
 	
I believe that any successful account of “health” and “disease” will attend to the practical 
issues of healthcare – that is, to healing people, to administering medical procedures – and not just 
the theoretical and conceptual problems. After all, healthcare fields such as medicine, nursing, public 
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health, clinical psychology, physical therapy, dentistry, pharmacy, and optometry are not primarily 
theoretical fields. On the contrary, as we have seen, their main purpose is to provide people with a 
particular kind of service: medical care.  
One may object that I am overstepping the proper boundaries of philosophy by venturing 
into the territory of medical treatment. Healthcare professionals are most qualified to decide how 
healthcare should be conducted, one might claim, since they are the ones with the most experience 
and knowledge concerning medical treatment. Doctors, nurses, dentists, dental hygienists, 
optometrists, pharmacists, and others involved in administering medical care should be the ones that 
decide who provides which kinds of treatments and when, because they are the people providing the 
treatments in the first place. Philosophers, on the other hand, do not have the expertise and training 
required to make these kinds of edicts. As such, Boorse has done well by keeping his account of 
“health” in the realm of the ontological, while I make myself presumptuous by telling healthcare 
providers how to do their jobs. 
In response to this criticism, I would reply that I do not wish to render exact, case-by-case 
judgments about how to treat individual patients. I do not have the training or qualification to make 
these kinds of judgments. As such, I leave the implementation of my theory to real healthcare 
professionals. Nor do I purport to furnish a comprehensive listing of which conditions are “healthy” 
and which are “diseased.” Whenever I mention specific diseases or kinds of cases, I mean simply to 
illustrate more general principles, rather than to make a statement about those particular cases. On 
the whole, I wish for my account of “health” and “disease” to provide general principles about what 
kinds of things are healthy, and therefore worth promoting, and what kinds of things are diseases, 
and therefore worth ameliorating. 
Furthermore, I do not agree that healthcare providers should be the sole voice in setting the 
principal goals and tenets of healthcare. Healthcare concerns all of us. Our existence depends on the 
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structural integrity of our bodies, which are breakable and fragile; virtually all of us seek medical 
treatment at some time or another. We need our bodies to do the things we want to do. Moreover, 
healthcare is a complex field involving law, economics, business, ethics, social justice, ergonomics, 
religion, sociology, anthropology, and myriad other fields of study. It is intertwined with nearly every 
aspect of our lives, precisely because our bodily faculties are an indispensible part of living a happy 
and truly human life. As such, healthcare far transcends healthcare providers. In order for the 
healthcare system to work effectively, it requires everyone’s input and cooperation: not only 
healthcare providers, but also lawmakers, clergy, economists, anthropologists, ethicists, and, not 
least, patients. To treat healthcare providers as the sole authorities on health and healthcare is akin to 
treating barbers as the sole authorities on hair fashion. 
In summary, I wish to shift the focus in medicine from thinking about “health” as 
something a person’s body can have, to a concept of “health” as a set of activities that a person can 
do. Following Nussbaum, I believe that health has less to do with whether people’s physiological 
variables fall into certain ranges, and more with “what people are actually able to do and to be” 
(Nussbaum 2000, 5). Accordingly, I envision a healthcare system whose everyday procedures and 
goals are attentive to people’s bodily capabilities: to those abilities that give people wherewithal to 
pursue purpose in life. People’s baseline goal of capability will be the baseline goal of medical 
treatment.  
 
Overview 
 
 In Chapter I, I outline Christopher Boorse’s (1977) Biostatistical Theory (BST), which is the 
leading account of “health” in the philosophy of medicine literature. I examine a handful of the 
myriad criticisms leveled against the BST over the past four decades and draw some conclusions 
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about what a successful account of “health” must be able to do. Then, in Chapter II, I explain why I 
think the BST would be a poor guide to medical treatment. In Chapter III, I outline Martha 
Nussbaum’s (2000) capability approach to international justice, which I then use as a model for my 
account of “health.” I use the Conclusion to set future research objectives based upon my account 
of “health” as capability. 
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Chapter I 
Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory 
 
Christopher Boorse claims that “health” and “disease” are objective, “value-free” biological 
concepts (Boorse 1977, 542). The theoretical concepts of medicine, Boorse asserts, are rooted in 
physiology – that is, the subfield of biology concerned with how the parts of a multicellular 
organism work together to enable the organism’s survival and reproduction. The physiological 
function of some part of the body, as Boorse explains, is whatever that part does to contribute an 
individual’s survival and reproduction (hereby abbreviated “S & R”). 
According to Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory (BST), roughly speaking, a “disease” is an 
abnormally low contribution by part of an individual’s body to her S & R, as compared with some 
statistically normal range for the individual’s species, sex, and age. “Health” is the absence of disease 
(Boorse 1977, 555). In other words, “disease” occurs when a part or system of an individual’s body 
falls below species-normal levels of physiological functioning; and “health” is a state in which a 
person’s body performs all of its species-normal physiological functions at an average or above-
average level.  
In Section 1 of this chapter, I will explicate more thoroughly the concept of “physiological 
function” on which Boorse builds his concepts of “health” and “disease.” In Section 2, I will 
examine Boorse’s concept of health as species-normal functioning and why, according to Boorse, 
this concept is theoretical and scientific rather than normative. Then, in Section 3, I will examine 
some of the major existing criticisms the BST: in particular, those of Kingma (2007), Cooper (2002), 
Amundson (2000), Guerrero (2010), and Boorse himself (2014). These criticisms draw me towards a 
handful of general conclusions about health and disease: 
	 12 
(C1) Any theory of health as statistical normality will be value-laden, despite the BST’s claims of 
being value-free. We cannot choose reference classes for our judgments of health and disease based 
upon empirical and scientific criteria alone. Rather, any choice of reference class will appeal to 
normative values, at least to some extent. As such, we should strive to identify a clear and prudent 
normative anchor for our theory of health and disease, instead of letting a thousand flowers bloom 
in the garden of medicine (Section 3.1.1). 
(C2) If our account of health and disease is to do us any good, it cannot be merely “theoretical,” as 
Boorse claims the BST is. Our account must also be practical: that is to say, it must give us definite 
recommendations about which medical treatments are appropriate, and under what circumstances 
(Sections 3.1.1 and 3.3). 
(C3) Humans are not only physiologically diverse, but also genetically, epigenetically, 
developmentally, behaviorally, and anatomically varied. A theory of health and disease should take 
these kinds of variation into account. The BST fails to do so largely because physiological normality 
is far too narrow a basis to encompass all, or even most, kinds of human variation (Sections 3.1.2, 
3.2.1, and 3.4). 
(C4) Not all judgments of health and disease depend on an individual’s sex and age. In general, age 
seems relatively important in distinguishing health from disease, but sex seems less important. 
Therefore, our theory of health and disease should account for age differences in physiology on a 
fundamental level; but it will deal with sex differences in physiology on a case-by-case basis (Section 
3.1.2). 
(C5) Because of (C3) and (C4), no account of health as statistical normality can have whole-
organism reference classes. There are simply too many kinds of whole-organism functional designs 
within the human species; people’s functional makeup varies combinatorially with respect to 
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numerous different axes of variation. Thus, judgments of health and disease cannot be relative to 
some statistically normal organismal design (Section 3.1.2). 
(C6) Moreover, we should re-frame talk of statistical normality in terms of mode of function – that is, 
the distinct manner in which a biological subsystem fulfills a particular kind of biological goal, e.g., 
“communication.” The notion of “mode of function” helps us to transcend Boorse’s discussion of 
health as a statistically typical contribution to survival and reproduction – which goals are much 
narrower than those medicine is concerned with – and to think about the different ways in which 
people achieve more immediate and concrete goals, such as moving from place to place; obtaining 
nourishment; and using reason, planning, and imagination (Section 3.2.1). 
(C7) The BST would be medically and societally harmful as an account of medical treatment. At the 
very least, the notion of “normal function” on which it depends is socially fraught (Section 3.3). 
(C8) Our account of health and disease must appeal to a concept of qualitative function that is 
somehow characteristic of human beings, but not statistically so (Section 3.2.2). 
 Ultimately, I hope for my account to modify several aspects of the BST, but to retain some 
of its core principles: namely, the goal-directedness of life, and the notion that health is the absence 
of disease. I will discuss these changes to the BST in detail in Chapter III and the Conclusion. To 
summarize these changes in a few words, I believe that health depends on an individual’s ability to 
perform certain characteristically human activities – I call them “basic bodily capabilities” – rather 
than on the contributions that the parts of her body make to her survival and reproduction. 
 
1. Goal-Contribution Functions 
  
Boorse uses the concept of “physiological function” as the foundation for his theory of 
health and disease. In order to understand what it means for some trait to have a physiological 
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function, we must investigate Boorse’s account of what “functions” are in the first place. Boorse 
holds a goal-contribution view of function, according to which a “function” is a causal contribution to 
the goals of some goal-directed system (Boorse 1976, 77-78). “Functions,” Boorse asserts, “are, 
purely and simply, contributions to goals” (ibid., 77). Boorse does not state explicitly what kinds of 
entities have goals, or what kinds of systems are goal-directed. He does, however, offer several 
examples of systems that are goal-directed – living organisms, thermostats, guided missiles – and 
systems that are not – pens, chairs, Bibles (ibid., 79-80). Moreover, he defines goal-directed behavior 
as such: 
To say that an action or process A is directed to the goal G is to say… that within some range of 
environmental variation A would have been modified in whatever way was required for G (ibid., 78). 
 
 That is to say, goal-directed behaviors are those that tend towards some result or end state 
despite environmental perturbations. For example, we could call the behavior of a guided missile 
“goal-directed,” since such a missile modifies its behavior in whatever way is necessary to hit a 
particular target. More specifically, the missile may adjust its speed, trajectory, or detonation time to 
account for environmental perturbations such as random gusts of wind, movement by the target, 
physical obstacles, etc. We could also consider goal-directed many of the intentional and non-
intentional behaviors of living organisms. 2 A bacterium, to note an instance of non-intentional goal-
direction, may use chemotaxis to propel itself towards higher concentrations of a particular nutrient 
(McShea 2012). Pens, chairs, and most other artifacts, by contrast, do not in themselves exhibit goal-
directed behavior. For example, a pen has no way to keep its ink from freezing when the 
environment is very cold; to keep its ink from oozing when the environment is very hot, or when I 
chew the end of it; to escape when I am about to discard it; etc. 
																																																								2	I will use the word “intentional” to refer to the conscious goals of higher animals. Conversely, I will use 
“non-intentional” to refer to the non-conscious goals of plants, animals, bacteria, and goal-directed artifacts 
such as thermostats. 
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Presumably, Boorse means for “goal-directed systems” to be exactly those systems that 
exhibit goal-directed behavior.3 In light of this interpretation, let us consider Boorse’s formal 
definition of goal-contribution function: 
X is performing the function Z in the G-ing of S at t, means:  
At t, X is Z-ing and the Z-ing of X is making a causal contribution to the goal G of the goal-directed 
system S (Boorse 1976, 80). 
 
Thus, an activity counts as a goal-contribution function just when it is causally contributing 
to a goal of some goal-directed system. As I understand, Boorse employs a more-or-less colloquial 
definition of “contributory cause:” an activity contributes causally to some goal just when it helps to 
bring that goal about. Boorse does not explore this notion of causal contribution at length, but 
rather gives it only cursory treatment: 
This notion of a causal contribution, or contributory cause, has come to seem unnecessarily obscure 
since [Ernst] Nagel's unhappy references to necessary and sufficient conditions. It is true that 
contributory causes are not only insufficient but need not even be necessary for their effects. The 
pumping of the heart may be a contributory cause to the circulation of the blood without being 
essential to it, since circulation can occur by artificial means… For purposes of discussing teleology, 
we are clear enough what it means to say that the heart is helping to cause the circulation of the 
blood, even if a heart-lung machine is ready to switch on at a moment's notice… one may say that 
heart action is contributing to circulation when circulation is occurring by, or via, heart action, and let 
it go at that (ibid., 78). 
 
 Thus, Boorse’s drive-by characterization of “causal contribution” leaves the notion fairly 
vague. Nonetheless, we might suppose, based upon Boorse’s heart example, that item X contributes 
to goal G of system S just when X does something to S, or within S, that helps S attain or produce G. 
In the case of the heart, we may say that the heart (X) contributes to the individual organism’s (S) 
goal of pumping blood (G) by interacting with other parts of the organism in certain ways: e.g., 
propagating electrical potentials that allow heart muscle to contract in such a way as to expel the 
																																																								3	Whether Boorse means for goal-directed systems to have some distinguishing ontological or structural 
feature is unclear; if he does, he does not say so explicitly. 
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blood into the aorta. So I will proceed by interpreting “causal contribution” in this broad manner, as 
some effect on or within a goal-directed system that helps the system to attain a goal.4 
In addition to the notion of “causal contribution,” there are a few other important details to 
note about Boorse’s formal definition of function. First, X need not belong to system S in order to 
perform a function with respect to S’s goals. Thus, even though atmospheric oxygen is not strictly a 
part of our body, yet it standardly performs the function of participating in the electron transport 
chain, since this activity contributes to our body’s goal of performing aerobic respiration. 
Furthermore, an activity Z need not be goal-directed itself in order to count as a goal-contribution 
function. As such, we might say that the Earth’s gravity is performing the function of keeping us 
from floating into outer space, water is performing the function of undergoing hydrolysis reactions 
in our bodies, and needles perform the function of injecting vaccine into our bloodstreams. Even 
though none of these things are goal-directed in themselves – gravity, hydrolysis reactions, needle-
injections – their effects in these cases contribute to goals of systems that are – namely, individual 
humans. 
Moreover, X need not do activity Z regularly or characteristically. Indeed, as Boorse notes, 
“functions may be performed only once and by accident” (ibid. 80). For example, suppose that I 
accidentally tripped and fell over a fence in front of a huge cliff. Suppose further that my belt 
fortuitously got caught on the fence, preventing me from falling to my death and thereby 
																																																								4	Coupled with Boorse’s definition of “function” as causal contribution to a goal, this broad articulation of 
“contributory cause” allows us to make some unusual function ascriptions. For example, the Big Bang has 
helped me in innumerable ways to achieve my goal of getting an “A” on the neurobiology exam, including 
causing the Earth and the Sun to form; causing Earth to have the right conditions so as to support living 
beings, including (eventually) me and my neurobiology instructor; etc. As such, we could say that the Big 
Bang has contributed causally to my getting an “A” grade on my neurobiology exam, and therefore that the 
Big Bang has performed such-and-such functions in helping me to get an “A.” While this function statement 
sounds outlandish – we virtually never attribute functions to large cosmic events such as the Big Bang – I 
think that the context-specificity of function ascription typically prevents us from making function statements 
of this kind, where the entities concerned are vastly separated in time, space, and scale (see below). 
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contributing to my goal of survival. In that moment – but in no others – my belt would be 
performing the function of keeping me from falling to the bottom of the cliff. 
This feature of goal-contribution functions does not respect the so-called “function-accident 
distinction,” as proposed in Larry Wright’s influential “Functions” (1973). Writing in the tradition of 
ordinary language analysis, Wright notices two distinct ways in which we commonly use the word 
“function”: (1) to describe “the” functions of an object, the object’s supposedly characteristic or 
paradigm activities; and (2) to describe things that the object “functions as,” things the object just 
happens to do (Wright 1973, 141-142). For example, it seems right to say that “The function of the 
heart is pumping blood,” but it does not seem right to say that “The function of the heart is to make 
thumping sounds,” even though in practice the heart may “function as” a sound-maker. In fact, the 
heart may function as many different things: a diagnostic tool, a transplanted organ, a thing that gets 
hit by muons, etc. But these activities, according to Wright, are accidental effects rather than the 
functions of the heart. 
Wright claims that “the” function of an object whatever effect the object has that explains 
why it exists in the first place. On the other hand, the things that an object merely “functions as” – 
the things the object does “accidentally” – are activities that do not explain the object’s existence 
(ibid., 161). According to this distinction, for example, the function of my belt is holding my pants 
up, but not saving me from falling to my death. Holding my pants up is what the belt does that 
explains why it exists: the manufacturer made the belt in order for people to use it as a device for 
holding up pants. The belt exists in the first place because it is supposed to hold pants up. On the other 
hand, the belt’s saving me from falling to my death does not explain why it exists. The manufacturer 
almost certainly did not make the belt with the function of saving Sam’s life in mind. Rather, the belt 
(fortuitously!) happened to function as such in the moment that I fell over the fence. 
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Contrary to Wright, however, Boorse asserts that there is no important conceptual 
distinction between “the function” and “functioning as.” “To accept our analysis of performing a 
function,” he expounds, 
is to settle the question of what sort of thing a function is – namely, a contribution to a goal… what 
more is required for a function performed by X to be among ‘the functions’ of X is not any fixed 
general property but instead varies from context to context (Boorse 1976, 81). 
 
Put differently, Boorse claims that in either kind of case – whether “the function” of X is Z, 
or whether X merely “functions as” a Z – X is unequivocally performing the function of Z by 
contributing to a goal. Whether or not we call some effect “the function” of an item depends not on 
the characteristics of the item or the effect, per se, but on the context of discourse (ibid., 81). More 
specifically,  
 “The function of X is Z” means that in some contextually definite system S with contextually 
definite goal(s) G, during some contextually definite time interval t, the Z-ing of X is [a] member of a 
contextually circumscribed class of functions being performed during t by X in the G-ing of X – that 
is, causal contributions to G (Boorse 1977, 82). 
 
 In other words, ascriptions of goal-contribution function are relative to (a) a particular goal-
directed system, or type of goal-directed system, (b) a particular goal of that system, (c) a particular 
time interval, and (d) a particular subset of functions that the item in question performs with respect 
to that goal, of that system, in that time interval. The relevant systems, goals, and timespans depend 
in turn upon the scope of inquiry. For example, relative to the human species’ (S) evolutionary 
persistence (G) over millennia (t), it seems wrong to say that “the” function of Sam’s belt (X) is 
keeping Sam from falling off a cliff (Z). On the other hand, Sam’s belt may have this function 
relative to Sam’s (S) survival (G) in the isolated times that he happens to fall off cliffs (t).5 
Of course, there are myriad types of living systems that exist over dramatically different 
periods of time and pursue a diverse collection of goals – different kinds of cells, organisms, 
																																																								5	Regardless of the context of discourse, though, Boorse’s account allows us to say that Sam’s belt is, in at 
least one dreadful instance, performing the function of keeping Sam from falling.	
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populations, species, lineages, etc. – and life scientists restrict the scope of their inquiries only to 
certain subsets of those goals, time periods, and systems. Indeed, Boorse posits that the different 
disciplines within the life sciences are distinguished by the systems, goals, and timespans with which 
they are concerned. “In physiology,” he propounds, “the goal-directed system S is the individual 
organism and the relevant goals its own survival and reproduction” (ibid. 84). On the other hand, an 
evolutionary biologist may be interested in the survival and reproduction of populations, lineages, 
and species over time courses ranging from several generations to several million years. An ecologist 
may study the maintenance of equilibrium in present-day ecosystems (ibid. 84-85). Healthcare 
professionals, as I will argue in Chapter III, are or should be interested in the maintenance of the 
basic capabilities of individual humans, e.g., communicating, moving from one place to another, and 
obtaining nourishment. 
 
2. The Biostatistical Theory (BST) of Health and Disease 
 
In order to build his theory of health and disease, Boorse begins by asserting that medicine 
derives its theoretical concepts from physiology: 
… different subfields of biology (e.g., genetics and ecology) may use different goals as the focus of 
their function statements. But it is only the subfield of physiology whose functions seem relevant to 
health. On the basis of what appears in physiology texts, I suggest that these functions are, 
specifically, contributions to individual survival and reproduction (Boorse 1977, 556). 
 
 Thus, as we have seen in Section 1, physiological functions are a genus of goal-contribution 
functions for which the relevant system is an individual animal, the relevant stretch of time the 
animal’s lifespan, and the relevant goal that animal’s S & R. Moreover, as Boorse submits here, these 
physiological functions form the theoretical basis for the concepts “health” and “disease.”  
In particular, “disease” is the failure of an individual’s body to perform some species-typical 
physiological function at a species-typical level of efficiency (ibid., 559). Put differently, a “disease” is 
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the failure of some part or system of an individual’s body to contribute to that individual’s S & R 
what it generally contributes in other members of the species. Health, on the other hand, is the 
absence of disease – that is, the normal physiological functioning of all the parts of an individual’s 
body (ibid. 542, 562, 567). In order to fully understand these claims about health and disease, we 
must probe several of the concepts involved: (1) “species-typical function,” (2) “species-typical level 
of efficiency,” (3) health as the absence of disease, and (4) “normal physiological functioning.” I will 
address each of these notions in turn. 
 Although physiological functions are contributions to the S & R of individual animals, as 
Boorse observes, generalizations about animal physiology range over groups of organisms with 
similar functional organization (ibid., 556).6 When a physiology textbook explains, for example, that 
the function of the gallbladder in human is bile storage, the textbook does not mean that bile storage 
is the function of the gallbladder in one particular human; rather, it means the function of the 
gallbladder is bile storage in humans generally. As Boorse points out, 
… physiological function statements are about a trait’s standard contribution [to S & R] in some 
population or reference class, e.g. a species. A text may say that the function of the human lens is to 
focus light on the retina. This claim is not falsified by the existence of people with cataracts, or no 
lens at all… In general, function statements describe species or population characteristics, not any 
individual plant or animal” (ibid., 556-557). 
 
 So physiological function statements have to do with the “standard” – or statistically normal 
– contribution that a trait makes to the S & R of organisms of a particular reference class. Boorse 
proposes moreover that these generalizations apply primarily to species (ibid., 557). As evidence for 
this claim, Boorse notes that organisms within a given species usually share a common structural and 
functional arrangement: all of the individuals in a species possess essentially the same parts and 
processes, and these parts and processes interact in roughly the same spatiotemporal patterns. In 
short, organisms within a species share a similar “hierarchy of interlocking functional systems” (ibid., 																																																								6	As we shall see, Boorse interprets ‘similar functional organization’ to be shared by members of the same 
species, sex, and age (ibid., 557-558). 
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557). Boorse calls the arrangement of parts and processes common to members of a given species 
the “species design”: 
Our species and others are in fact highly uniform in structure and function; otherwise there would be 
no point to the extreme detail in textbooks of human physiology. This uniformity of functional 
organization I call the species design (ibid., 557). 
 
  To summarize, then, species are the reference classes for physiological generalizations, since 
the individuals of a given species are more or less the same in their composition and arrangement.7 
The species design results from statistical abstraction over the individuals that make up a species. It 
consists of the parts and processes that are statistically normal for a member of the species to have, 
and the statistically normal physiological functions performed by each of these parts and processes 
(ibid., 557).  
The physiological functions in a species design are the so-called “species-typical functions” 
mentioned above. To illustrate, we might say that one of the species-typical functions of the human 
pancreas is releasing glucagon when blood sugar levels are low. This claim is true because most 
human pancreases indeed release glucagon under levels of low blood sugar. Notice that the claim 
does not require that all human pancreases do so: indeed, some people’s pancreases may fail to 
release glucagon at all, or release it when blood sugar is not low. Thus, releasing glucagon is a 
species-typical function of the pancreas because it is statistically normal for that organ to release 
glucagon when blood glucose levels dip below a certain range; and this activity is one of the ways in 
which pancreases typically contribute to an individual’s S & R.  
Boorse refines his initial definition of “species design” to accommodate three exceptions to 
the notion of species uniformity: polymorphic traits, sex differences, and age differences.8 Boorse 																																																								7	It is not entirely clear to me why a generalization about the function of a particular trait must be relative to a 
species, rather than to all of the organisms that possess that trait across several species – especially if that trait 
does basically the same things in all the species that possess it, as with, e.g., the nerve cord. 8	Polymorphic traits are traits for which there are several different yet functionally equivalent variants in a 
population. Some prominent examples include eye color, blood type, and hair color. It is unclear, however, 
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reasons that we should include polymorphic traits in species designs disjunctively, because there may 
not be one statistically normal phenotype for a given polymorphic trait; on the contrary, a trait may 
have myriad variants, each possessed by only a few individuals. But even if one of the variants were 
statistically normal, we would not necessarily want to exclude all the others from the species design 
(ibid., 558). For example, suppose that it were statistically normal for humans to have brown eyes. 
Rather than banish all other eye colors from the species design – green, blue, hazel, etc. – we might 
say that it is statistically normal for humans to have brown or green or hazel or blue or … eyes. 
As Boorse points out, furthermore, the physiological traits of a species often vary 
significantly with sex and age. In fact, sex and age are usually associated with an entire suite of 
distinct physiological features – an entire “functional design” of their own (ibid., 558). Accordingly, 
it would be insensible to include age- and sex-based differences in traits in the species design 
disjunctively, as we have above with polymorphic traits: 
Only a poor observer would be satisfied with noting that human beings typically have either ovaries 
or testicles, either wombs or penises, either large or small breasts, etc. The female characters occur 
together and constitute a single coherent functional design, as do the male's. Hence a disjunctive 
treatment of sex is inadequate (ibid., 558). 
 
 Thus, Boorse declares, each sex within a species has a unique functional arrangement. The 
same is true of individuals of different ages within a sex of a species. An infant, for example, has a 
manifestly different array of traits than, say, a young adult woman, who in turn has a different array 
of traits than an elderly man (ibid., 558). As Boorse illustrates, “…there are functions performed in 
the human infant and not in the adult, e.g. enlargement of the skeleton, and also the reverse, e.g. 
sperm production or ovulation” (ibid., 558). With these considerations in mind, Boorse amends his 
original concept of “species design” to encompass a slightly narrower type of reference class: 
namely, species, sex, and age (ibid., 558). As such, physiological generalizations apply to a particular 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
exactly what distinguishes a polymorphism from a disease, because the notion of “functional equivalence” is 
vague. 
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sex and age group of a species. 
 Now that I have explicated Boorse’s notion of “species-typical function” and the concept of 
“species design” that underlies it, I will briefly outline what it means for a trait to contribute to S & 
R with a “species-typical level of efficiency.” As we have seen, each organ in a given species has one 
or more species-typical functions, as dictated by the species design. In humans, for example, a 
species-typical function of the teeth is tearing and grinding food; of the outer ear, channeling sound 
to the tympanic membrane; of serum albumin, carrying nonpolar molecules in the bloodstream; etc. 
Moreover, each organ may perform its species-typical function with varying levels of success. For 
example, an Olympic swimmer’s lungs may perform their species-typical function – i.e., breathing – 
with extremely high efficiency, whereas an elderly smoker’s lungs may perform this function poorly. 
A young, healthy adolescent’s liver may metabolize toxins quickly, whereas the cirrhotic liver of a 
chemical factory worker may do so more slowly. In summary, each organ contributes at a different 
level to an individual’s S & R. 
 In fact, Boorse expounds, each part and process in the species design contributes to S & R 
within a statistically typical range of levels. For example, the human thyroid generally secretes 
thyroid hormone within some statistically typical range of concentrations. The statistically typical 
level of contribution of a trait to S & R is the “species-typical level of functional efficiency” 
mentioned above. So we have now elucidated more exactly what Boorse means when he says that 
“disease” is a failure of a particular part or process of the body to perform its species-typical 
function with a species-typical level of efficiency. We can reinterpret this definition as something like 
the following: Disease is a failure of some trait to contribute to individual S & R in the manner it 
normally does, and at the level of performance that it normally does, in others of the same species, 
sex, and age. 
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 Boorse makes two further clarifications about what it means for a trait to “fail” to perform 
its species-typical function with species-typical efficiency. First, a trait only counts as diseased if it 
performs below the species-typical range of efficiency – that is, if it makes a significantly lower-than-
average contribution to individual S & R. Put differently, a trait’s performing significantly above the 
species-typical range of efficiency is not a disease (ibid., 558-559). Second, performing above the 
species-typical range of efficiency is not necessarily the same as doing more than average of a 
particular process. As Boorse illustrates this point as such: 
In one sense… a function is the concrete process that makes a physiological contribution, e.g. 
thyroid secretion. In this sense there can be too much thyroid function, i.e. hyperthyroidism. This is 
not our usage, since for us the function is the contribution to physiological goals, and too much 
thyroid secretion damages these goals as much as too little… the function of the thyroid is not 
merely to secrete hormones, but to secrete the right amount… For us there is no such thing as 
excessive function… What health allows is unusual efficiency of a process in serving physiological 
goals, not unusually much of the process itself (ibid., 559). 
 
 So performing a function with above-average efficiency means that a trait makes a greater-
than-average contribution to individual S & R – not that the trait does the function more frequently 
or abundantly than average. To offer another example, one of the species-typical functions of the 
immune system is initiating an inflammatory response when particular antigens are detected. 
Intuitively, we would consider it a disease if the immune system continually failed to launch an 
appropriate response to invading bacteria and viruses, as may be the case, for instance, in individuals 
with AIDS. But on the BST, it is also a disease if the immune system responds to too many antigens, 
as may be the case in individuals with severe allergies. To respond to antigens with above-average 
efficiency would mean that an immune system is unusually precise in identifying and attacking 
potentially harmful species – bacteria, fungi, viruses – and leaving alone harmless particles – e.g., 
grass pollen, cat hair, one’s own cartilage. 
 To conclude our discussion of “disease,” I will highlight one more of Boorse’s 
terminological conventions. Clearly, the phrase “performing a species-typical function with species-
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typical efficiency” is rather unwieldy. In order to streamline his discussion, Boorse abbreviates this 
phrase simply as “normal function” (ibid., 555). Thus, we may state compactly that “disease” is a 
failure of some part or process to perform its normal function.  
 As we have seen, then, Boorse maintains that “health” is the absence of disease. Now that 
we have investigated Boorse’s concept of “disease,” we are in a better position to understand what it 
means for an individual to be free of disease. Since “disease” is the failure of a trait to perform its 
normal function, “health” must be a state in which all of the parts and processes of an individual’s 
body perform their normal physiological functions – that is, in which all of an individual’s traits 
perform their typical functions at an average or above-average level of efficiency. 
 Although health involves an individual’s performing all the functions typical to her species, 
sex, and age, Boorse indicates astutely that health does not involve performing all species-typical 
functions at all possible times. Indeed, in a manner of speaking, health involves performing the right 
functions at the right times (ibid., 562). We would not want to consider it healthy, for instance, if an 
individual’s body continually performed all of the functions typical of childbirth. Conversely, a 
person’s body may perform all of the functions appropriate in her day-to-day life, yet fail to perform 
some functions that are particular to certain uncommon situations. For instance, one may appear 
perfectly healthy under most conditions yet lack the ability to exercise without risking death, as may 
be the case with some persons with sickle cell anemia. Boorse summarizes this aspect of health 
succinctly: 
… biological functions are usually performed on appropriate occasions, not continuously. What 
occasions are appropriate is an empirical fact about the reference class. Thus vision occurs when the 
eyes are open, digestion when food is in the alimentary canal, adrenalin secretion under stress, 
sweating when temperature is rising, blood-clotting after a wound, and so on. At any one time an 
organism might be functioning normally with respect to its current situation, yet be incapacitated 
from doing so on occasions yet to arise… (ibid., 562). 
 
Put differently, normal functions are situation-specific. Different functions and levels of 
performance are typical in different contexts. For instance, a heart rate of 180 beats per minute may 
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be typical during intense anaerobic exercise, but not while resting. It is normal to see clearly on dry 
land, but not underwater. As such, “health” requires more than normal physiological functioning at 
a given moment: it requires that all of the body’s parts and processes are prepared to function 
normally in every likely context (ibid., 562).9 In Boorse’s words, health requires “normal functional 
readiness” or “normal functional ability,” which consists in “the readiness of each internal part to 
perform all its normal functions on typical occasions with at least typical efficiency” (ibid., 562). In 
more basic terms, “normal functional readiness” involves the readiness of each part of the body to 
contribute to individual S & R what it does in most members of the species.10  
Thus, we have expanded upon Boorse’s notions of “health” as the absence of disease, i.e., as 
normal physiological functioning by all the body’s parts. We can now interpret the BST from a 
birds-eye view, as it were, observing Boorse’s formal definitions of “health” and “disease”: 
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform functional design; specifically, an age 
group of a sex or species. 
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of the reference class is a statistically typical 
contribution by it to their individual survival and reproduction. 
3. Health in a member of the reference class is normal functional ability: the readiness of each internal 
part to perform all its normal functions on typical occasions with at least typical efficiency. 
4. A disease is a type of internal state which impairs health, i.e., reduces one or more functional 
abilities below typical efficiency” (ibid., 562). 
 
In the next section, I will address prominent criticisms of the BST’s notions of “health” and 
“disease,” paying special attention to those of Elselijn Kingma, whose 2007 paper addresses 
problems with (1) and whose 2010 paper focuses on (3); Rachel Cooper (2002), who targets (1); and 
Ron Amundson (2000), who scrutinizes (1) and (2), as well as the sociopolitical consequences of 
glorifying one mode of biological functioning over others. 
																																																								9	It is not entirely clear which contexts a species design should account for, and which it should ignore; see 
Kingma’s (2010) criticisms and Boorse’s (2014) response in Section 3.  10	For the remainder of the thesis, I will use the term “normal physiological functioning” as shorthand for 
“normal functional readiness” unless stated otherwise.	
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3. Criticisms of the BST 
 
 In this section, I survey previous criticisms of several aspects of the BST, including Boorse’s 
choice of reference classes and his justification thereof (3.1), and the notion of “statistical normality” 
(3.2). I also expand upon Boorse’s assertion that the BST is not an account of medical treatment, or 
so-called “practical health,” by demonstrating that the theory would lead to spurious medical 
judgments if it were adopted as such (3.3). Finally, I show why the BST’s notion of theoretical health 
– independent of any notion of medical treatment – needs updating, despite Boorse’s stubborn 
adherence to the theory as he articulated it in 1977. Namely, I note briefly some of the important 
advancements in biology in the past forty years that have rendered the BST outdated (3.4). 
 Before I begin my critique of the BST, I want make a quick note about the relationship 
between “reference classes” and “statistical normality.” According to Boorse, “health” is statistical 
normality with respect to some reference class. So whether an individual is “statistically normal,” i.e. 
healthy, depends on the reference class to which we compare her. In other words, the reference 
classes we choose will determine the exact meaning of “statistical normality” in the BST. For 
example, if the reference class includes species and sex but not age, our judgment of a 49-year-old 
woman’s health will depend on average physiological functions among all women, from newborns 
to centenarians. On the other hand, if the reference class includes species, sex, and age, the woman’s 
health will be relative to average physiological function among only middle-aged women. 
Accordingly, criticisms of the notion of “reference class” will overlap to some extent with the notion 
of “statistical normality,” and vice versa. 
 
3.1. Reference Class & Species Design 
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3.1.1. Kingma 
 
In her 2007 “What Is It to Be Healthy?” Kingma contends that the BST is not “value-free” – 
contrary to Boorse’s advertisements – because there is no way to choose appropriate reference 
classes for claims about “health” and “disease” using empirical facts alone. Kingma begins her 
discussion by affirming one of the principal insights of the BST: that any account of “health” as 
“statistical normality” cannot make health relative to statistical normality among the entire species, but 
rather must consider reference classes smaller than the species in order to account for differences in 
overall functional design (Kingma 2007, 128). Because of these differences in overall functional 
design, as Kingma notes, “what is normal in one group can be abnormal in another” (ibid., 128). 
Suppose, for example, that it is statistically normal for human beings to communicate using 
language, whether spoken, signed, read, or otherwise. We would not want therefore to call newborn 
infants “diseased” because they cannot do so.  To offer a different example, children’s health cannot 
be relative to statistical normality among the elderly, or else most children would be severely 
diseased, yet children with progeria could be perfectly healthy. Thus, different sub-groups of the 
human species function differently, and the concepts of “health” and “disease” should reflect these 
differences. In other words, we do not want to designate a particular condition as “diseased” unless 
it constitutes a departure from an appropriate sub-species reference class (ibid., 128). 
As Kingma continues, however, it is unclear exactly which sub-species reference classes are 
the appropriate ones with which to define “health” and “disease.” On one hand, our reference 
classes cannot be too specific, or else our concepts of “health” and “disease” will yield bizarre and 
erroneous conclusions. For example, 
If … we were to allow a separate reference class for uncommonly heavy drinkers, then the 
statistically normal range for liver-functions in this group would include liver-functions normally 
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considered a disease. The BST… would then entail that these liver functions are normal and these 
heavy drinkers therefore are healthy (ibid., 128). 
 
 In general, an account of “health” and “disease” as statistical normality will lead us astray if 
we pick inappropriately small or irrelevant reference classes, such as “uncommonly heavy drinkers, 
”women named Deborah, children with phenylketonuria, or residents of Huntsville, Alabama. On 
the other hand, we have already seen that overly inclusive reference classes – e.g., the whole human 
species, all mammals – also give the wrong results. Initially, then, there does not seem to be a 
straightforward way to determine the right reference classes for any concept of health as statistical 
normality. 
 With these complications in mind, Kingma interrogates the BST to find out how exactly 
Boorse has determined that species, sex, and age are the three relevant aspects of reference class. 
She begins by examining Boorse’s claim that a reference class is most basically “a natural class of 
organisms of uniform functional design” (Boorse 1977, 562). In particular, she analyzes this claim to 
uncover which part of it, if any, could allow Boorse a source of empirical justification for his 
designated reference classes: (1) naturalness, (2) uniformity, or (3) shared design (Kingma 2007, 129). 
 Boorse’s above claim about reference classes is particularly mysterious, as Kingma highlights, 
because it is unclear what Boorse means by “natural.” On one hand, he could simply mean for 
“natural” to mean something like “found in nature” or “naturally occurring” (ibid., 129). Kingma 
swiftly rejects this possibility. Myriad naturally occurring groups of organisms would constitute 
inappropriate reference classes: e.g., all of the organisms within three feet of me, all people that 
suffer from broken legs (ibid., 129). Perhaps, on the other hand, Boorse’s “natural” means “normal” 
or “statistically frequent.” Kingma also rejects this notion: there are many inappropriate reference 
classes that would include many or most human beings, such as the class containing all shortsighted 
persons, the class containing all persons with cuts and bruises, the class of all persons living in Asia, 
etc. (ibid., 129). Most plausibly, Boorse could consider “natural” to mean something like “natural 
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kind.” But this suggestion is also inadequate, as Kingma reasons – even “assuming that natural kinds 
exist” – because there is no clear reason why we should consider age and sex natural kinds, but not 
diseases (ibid., 129-130). To illustrate, it would seem dubious to consider as a natural kind the class 
“adult woman,” but not the classes “phenylketonuria” or “Tay-Sach’s disease” (ibid., 129-130). 
Thus, Kingma denies that Boorse can provide empirical justification for his reference classes using 
the notion of naturalness. 
 Kingma similarly dispenses with the possibility that either uniformity or shared functional 
design can serve as an empirical basis for the choice of reference classes. Uniformity is a poor basis 
for justifying reference classes, as she argues, because several genetic disorders – e.g., Down’s 
syndrome, Cushing’s disease – are associated with relatively uniform constellations of physiological 
features, just as are the classes “man” and “woman” (ibid., 130). There are several ways that we can 
interpret “shared design,” on the other hand; but none of them are adequate grounds for designating 
reference classes. We might suppose, in the first place, that a “designed” set of traits is one that is 
somehow “innate” or “inborn,” rather than acquired (ibid., 130). But numerous “innate” functional 
designs would be disastrous reference classes: for example, the class of all persons born with cystic 
fibrosis, or the class of all persons with the genetic mutations associated with Huntington’s disease. 
Perhaps, Kingma proposes, Boorse means for “designed” to refer to those body parts and processes 
selected in evolution – that is to say, “naturally designed,” or “evolutionarily designed.” Yet selective 
pressures maintain several genetic diseases in the human population: e.g., sickle cell anemia (ibid., 
130-131). Thus, Kingma demonstrates that there are no obvious empirical grounds on which Boorse 
can justify his choice of reference classes. If Boorse cannot determine the appropriate reference 
classes using empirical notions alone, then the BST’s reference classes must be based on at least 
some extra-empirical – i.e., normative – considerations. This conclusion contradicts Boorse’s claim 
that the BST is value-free (ibid., 131). 
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 Boorse defends against the accusation that the BST is value-laden in his “Second Rebuttal 
on Health” (2014). He begins by clarifying that the BST does not offer novel concepts of “health” 
and “disease,” but rather defines the concepts of “health” and “disease” currently used in medicine. 
As such, the BST aims merely to identify the reference classes implicit in our pre-existing medical 
concepts of “health” and “disease,” rather than choosing them (Boorse 2014, 693). Moreover, 
Boorse asserts, 
A correct definition of concept H in terms of concepts C1, C2, ... Cn is value-laden precisely if one of 
the Ci is value-laden: that is, if a judgment of the form ‘x is Ci’ is a value judgment. It does not matter 
at all how concept H was ‘chosen,’ only what it is… The BST analyzes health using the [value-free] 
concepts of statistical normality, survival, reproduction, organism, part, process, species, sex, age, and 
causation (ibid., 693). 
 
 In other words, a definition is value-laden only if it contains value-laden concepts. The 
BST’s definitions of “health” and “disease,” Boorse claims, do not use any value-laden terms. On 
the contrary, all of the concepts employed in the BST, including those involved in specifying 
reference classes – species, sex, age, statistical normality – are strictly empirical. Therefore, the BST’s 
definitions of “health” and “disease” must be value-free. 
 In fact, Kingma anticipates this rebuttal in her 2007 paper. “Boorse would, I suspect, have a 
reply to this,” she predicts – “he would contend that his proposed reference classes simply are the 
reference classes that are relevant for the distinction between health and disease” (Kingma 2007, 
131). As she simulates Boorse, 
Different reference classes would generate different distinctions, but those are not the distinctions 
between health and disease. Although medicine might have chosen to engage with other distinctions 
and other concepts, this is only to say that medicine might have concerned itself with things other 
than health and disease. This does not make the distinction between health and disease evaluative 
(ibid., 131). 
 
Thus, Kingma preemptively pins down Boorse’s view that reference classes consisting of 
species, sex, and age are constitutive of “health” and “disease.” In response to this counterargument, 
she observes that there are several conditions – e.g., homosexuality – whose status as “healthy” or 
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“diseased” are currently disputed within the medical profession. Whether or not the BST considers 
homosexuality a disease, say, depends on which reference classes the BST includes. On Boorse’s 
original formulation of the BST, homosexuality would constitute a significantly subnormal 
contribution to reproduction among adult men and adult women, and so would count as a disease 
relative to either reference class. If we included sexual orientation in our reference classes, however, 
homosexuality would not be a disease (ibid., 131-132). Relative to the reference class of “gay adult 
men,” for example, an adult man’s sexual preference for other adult men would not count as a 
disease. Kingma calls this modified version of the BST the “XST” (ibid., 132).  
Whether homosexuality is a disease, Kingma reasons, depends on which of these two 
alternative formulations of the BST is correct. But whether the BST or the XST is correct depends 
on which reference classes are the appropriate ones. And as Kingma has already shown, there are no 
empirical facts that can determine which reference classes are the appropriate ones. "Therefore,” she 
concludes, “there is no empirical fact that tells us whether the BST or the XST is correct” (ibid., 
132). In essence, I think, this argument draws attention to the fact that the discipline of medicine itself is 
unsure of what the relevant reference classes are; that whether one choice of reference classes is 
superior to others depends partly on normative values; and that whichever reference classes we settle 
on, therefore, we will arrive at a theory of “health” and “disease” that appeals to normative 
considerations as well as empirical ones. 
Boorse’s reply to this argument is puzzling. He begins by reiterating that he has constructed 
the BST as such not for evaluative reasons, but “to choose that analysis which best fits medical 
usage” (Boorse 2014, 693): 
The medical concept of health that I seek to analyze already exists as a target. ‘Candidate concepts’ 
[such as the XST], by contrast, exist only in the minds of philosophers. So the only way to run an 
argument of this type is to claim that medicine—not the BST—has chosen one of many possible 
health concepts (ibid., 693). 
 
 There are several problems with this line of reasoning. For one, Boorse claims that the BST 
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is supposed to fit medical usage of the terms “health” and “disease;” yet the BST’s ruling that 
homosexuality is a disease contradicts the prevailing view of contemporary medicine (Boorse 1997, 
99; see also Murphy 2006, 32). Moreover, Boorse asserts that there is one medical concept of 
“health” and “disease,” and that any alternatives to it are philosophical fictions. But the reality of 
medicine seems quite different: at any given moment, medicine may harbor a large and diverse 
collection of candidate concepts of health and disease. We may consider as evidence for this claim 
the robust literature on the definitions of “health” and “disease,” which includes contributions from 
both philosophers and clinicians (in addition to Boorse, see Wakefield 1992 and Lange 2007). Due 
in part to our dim understanding of the brain and how it engenders the mind, and in part to the 
volatile social implications of labeling particular states of mind as “diseased,” the field of psychiatry 
especially contains a jungle of competing health concepts (see, e.g., Murphy 2006, Horowitz and 
Wakefield 2007). 
As Kingma’s “BST/XST” example suggests, the medical concept of “health” and “disease” 
is ambiguous, contested, and constantly shifting. Forty years ago, medicine generally considered 
homosexuality a psychiatric disorder; nowadays, it generally does not (Murphy 2006, 32). Regardless 
of medicine’s historical development, it is implausible to suppose that all the myriad sources that 
make up the medicine’s current knowledge base, with their myriad viewpoints and motivations – 
practitioners, academics, textbooks – mean the same thing when they mention “health” and 
“disease,” or even that all of these sources converge on the same definition. Thus, for Boorse to 
claim that there is only one theory of “health” and “disease,” and that the BST has tracked it, 
amounts to dismissing all competing accounts of “health” and “disease” without argument. 
To summarize, Kingma demonstrates that no theory of health as statistical normality can 
justify a choice of reference classes on an empirical basis alone. Therefore, the BST’s choice of 
reference classes is not value-free. As a result of its normatively tainted choice of reference classes, 
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the BST must be a value-laden theory of “health” and “disease.” 
As I have postponed mentioning until now, Kingma’s argument is not airtight. While 
Kingma dismisses the main three considerations on which Boorse bases his choice of reference 
classes – naturalness, uniformity, shared design – these notions are not necessarily the only empirical 
bases for justifying reference classes. There could be empirical bases of justification besides these 
three; but neither Kingma nor Boorse ventures to examine whether there really are. In other words, 
Kingma’s argument demonstrates that the BST is value-laden as articulated in Boorse’s 1977 paper, 
but not that it is inherently or irretrievably value-laden. Perhaps one could salvage the BST by 
finding some other empirical grounds for choosing species, sex, and age as the relevant determinants 
of reference class. I will leave this possibility to the side, however, partly because I myself cannot 
imagine what kinds of purely “naturalistic” or “empirical” criteria we could use to designate the 
appropriate reference classes, and partly because I am not, unlike Boorse, committed to the view 
that medicine’s theoretical concepts are devoid of value judgments. As we shall see, I hope to build 
an account of “health” and “disease” that uses biological terms and concepts, but that is openly 
normative at its core. Although I cannot for brevity’s sake comment more specifically on my 
positive account, I want to highlight three key takeaways from Kingma and Boorse’s exchange on 
reference class choice. 
First, as we have seen, Kingma has shown that we probably cannot choose reference classes 
based upon purely empirical considerations. On the contrary, someone must choose, at some point 
down the line, which classes of organisms are suitable for mutual comparison. If we are to pursue 
any account of health as statistical normality, then, we must locate some kind of normative anchor 
or principle with which to decide on the right reference classes. I intend to do just this in Chapter 
III. 
Second, Boorse’s indicates in his rebuttal to Kingma that the BST is supposed to reflect the 
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prevailing medical concepts of “health” and “disease.” Although we would think that the prevailing 
concept of “health” has changed dramatically over the past two centuries – which have seen the 
discovery of bacteria, viruses, and fungi as agents of disease, as well as the development of 
medications to combat them; the invention of countless medical procedures, technologies, and 
devices; the discovery that DNA is the genetic material, and that random alterations in it can cause 
cancer, among other maladies; etc. – Boorse oddly maintains that medicine’s theoretical concept of 
health is static, unchanging, and beyond the influence of human convention. “Neither individuals 
nor societies,” he proclaims, “have any power to decide what is a theoretically healthy human being” 
(Boorse 2014, 702). Thus, Boorse holds two conflicting views: (1) that the BST explicates the 
prevailing medical notion of “health,” which ostensibly depends on individual practitioners and 
academics (see, e.g., 693, 710), and (2) that the BST explicates a theoretical concept of “health” that 
does not depend on practitioners or academics, let alone anyone else (see, e.g., 701-702, 713). In 
addition to their internal inconsistency, these two views are also practically questionable. One of the 
characteristic jobs of medicine – perhaps the characteristic job – is providing physical treatment. If 
our theoretical concept of “health” is the same regardless of historical developments, scientific 
discoveries, or changes in medical and social convention, then the concept is meaningless as a guide 
to treatment. Moreover, as Kingma has hinted, and as the philosophical and clinical literatures attest, 
the concepts of “health” and “disease” are continually debated and contested. But Boorse denies the 
importance of this ongoing dialogue as such, reducing it instead to a quest for the one “true” 
medical concept of “health,” so to speak. As a result, the BST is rigid and does not allow for the 
possibility that medicine’s theoretical concepts will change in the future, as they apparently have in 
the past. If medicine does indeed change dramatically in the coming decades, the BST will eventually 
become outdated, a relic of an older era of medicine – i.e., that of the late 1970s, the era whose 
heath concepts the BST seeks to define. In essence, the BST petrifies late-‘70s concepts of “health” 
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and “disease,” taking those concepts as medicine’s timeless theoretical concepts, disregarding past 
and future changes in the field. Contrary to Boorse, I believe that an overarching account of 
“health” and “disease” should provide general principles and guidelines, but that the finer details 
should be left open to social and academic debate and interpretation: not only to parallel the ever-
morphing and contested nature of our “health” and “disease” concepts, but also to provide a 
conceptual, sociopolitical, and moral compass with which to navigate these future changes. 
Third, while Kingma argues convincingly that “naturalness” cannot provide adequate 
justification for our choice of reference classes, I think that she dismisses “uniformity” and “shared 
design” too hastily. True, these notions alone are too vague to establish reference classes – for 
example, how uniform must individuals be if they are to belong to the same class? in which aspects? 
with what kind of design? All the same, I suspect Boorse uncovers in uniformity and shared design 
two important, if incomplete, aspects of “health” and “disease” classifications. I will discuss the 
significance of these concepts briefly again in Section 3.2.1 and in the Conclusion. 
 
3.1.2. Cooper 
 
 Whereas Kingma objects to Boorse’s grounds for choosing reference classes, Rachel Cooper 
objects to very the notion of choosing reference classes. Briefly, Cooper contends in her “Disease” (2002) 
that a “disease” is any condition that people generally consider (1) bad – i.e., painful, disabling – (2) 
unfortunate, and (3) medically treatable (Cooper 2002, 271). She rejects Boorse’s view that we can 
define “disease” in terms of conformity to, or statistical normality with respect to, some reference 
class. Cooper observes first of all that human physiology varies widely, and that sex and age do not 
capture all the relevant aspects of this variation. “What’s normal for an organism,” Cooper asserts, 
“depends not only on species, sex and age, but also on a host of other factors”: 
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Masai are naturally sensitive to growth hormone, pygmies are not. Athletes normally have a lower 
heart rate than other people. People who live at high altitude, or in hot climates, adapt in various 
ways. Thus the organisms in a reference class must not only be of the same species, sex and age as 
the organism under consideration, but must also be of the same race and must have undergone 
similar training and have lived in the same kind of environment. (ibid., 266). 
 
In other words, Cooper claims that physiology varies widely based on differences in athletic 
training, ethnic background, and evolutionary environment of recent ancestors, among other 
factors.11 As such, we cannot make accurate judgments of “health” and “disease” based on statistical 
normality with respect merely to one’s age, sex, and species: these reference classes are too broad.12 
For example, a particular level of lung capacity may be pathologically low among people from high-
altitude societies but normal for people from low-altitude societies. A particular level of HGH 
sensitivity may be normal among pygmies but abnormally low among Masai. Accordingly, Cooper 
reasons, we must make our reference classes much narrower if we are to define “health” as statistical 
physiological normality with respect to a reference class (ibid., 266). 
But if we tighten our reference classes by incorporating all of the major determinants of 
physiological function in addition to those mentioned in the BST – level of athletic training, 
ethnicity, recent evolutionary background, current environmental conditions, etc. – Cooper claims 
that we will end up with reference classes that contain only one or a handful of members, e.g. 
“elderly female Masai mountain-bikers, Asian male teenagers who have been brought up in Wales, 
and half-Chinese, half-Eskimo boy toddlers” (ibid., 266). Clearly, these reference classes would be 
too small to render sensible judgments of health and disease. To illustrate, suppose we had a 
reference class containing only one person: the world’s lone middle-aged female Bantu mixed martial 
artist born and raised in Tibet. (Grant that such a person exists, and that there is only one.) This 
woman, then, is the reference class to which we would compare her physiological functioning. She 																																																								11	The idea that different races and ethnicities possess unique physiological features is both socially fraught 
and scientifically dubious. Although I would like to refute this troubled notion, I do not have the space to do 
so here. 12	Amundson (2000) makes a parallel point about the heterogeneity of human physiology. See Section 3.2.1. 
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constitutes the entirety of her own reference class. As such, anything that happens to this woman is 
statistically normal in her reference class. Therefore, the woman must always be, by definition, 
perfectly healthy, whether she falls and breaks her leg, suffers a concussion in a mixed martial arts 
competition, contracts cancer, or lives sans complication to age 105. Similarly, suppose we had a 
class with only four members: namely, the four elderly female Masai mountain-bikers. (Again, grant 
that four and only four such persons exist.) If three of the four happened to contract strep throat at 
a given point in time, then having strep throat would be statistically normal in the reference class, 
and therefore healthy. Thus, Cooper demonstrates that any theory of “health” as statistical normality 
will fail because its reference classes either will be (a) too small to give stable and sensible verdicts on 
health and disease, or (b) too inclusive to accommodate healthy diversity in human physiology. 
In addition to demonstrating that the BST’s reference classes are too broad and inclusive, 
Cooper’s criticisms also draw attention to the fact that the BST’s reference classes do not divide 
people up in the right sort of way. For the sake of brevity, I will not be able to address this point fully 
here. However, I suggest in the Conclusion that we can address the BST’s problems with reference 
classes by modeling different modes of performing basic bodily capabilities as causal role 
mechanisms, in the style of Cummins (1975) and Craver (2001). 
 
3.2. Statistical normality 
 
3.2.1 Amundson 
 
 In his “Against Normal Function” (2000), Ron Amundson refutes the BST using both 
scientific considerations, which I will examine in this subsection, and social and practical 
considerations, which I address in Section 3.3 below. As we have seen, Boorse theorizes that a 
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“disease” is a significantly below-average contribution to individual S & R by some part or process 
of the body, as compared to that in others of the same species, sex, and age (Boorse 1977, 562). As 
Boorse acknowledges, this approach to “disease” works neatly only if the members of a species are 
relatively uniform in their physiological makeup – that is, if physiological variation is relatively 
narrow for each trait type in the species. Fortunately, Boorse claims, human physiological variation 
is indeed relatively narrow: 
It would be a mistake to think that this notion of a species design [see Section 2 above] is 
inconsistent with evolutionary biology, which emphasizes constant variation. The typical result of 
evolution is precisely a trait's becoming established in a species, only rarely showing major variations 
under individual inheritance and environment. On all but evolutionary time scales, biological designs 
have a massive constancy vigorously maintained by normalizing selection. It is this short-term 
constancy on which the theory and practice of medicine rely (ibid., 557). 
 
 In other words, normalizing selection ensures that the qualitative and quantitative variations 
in physiological function within a species are small. Because most physiological functions fall within 
a narrow statistical distribution, we can identify sub-average functional performances, dramatic 
departures from the species design, with relatively little complication. Therefore, we can sensibly 
and profitably define “disease” as sub-average functioning (ibid., 557-558).  
Amundson does not dispute that some kinds of bodily variation are healthy and others are 
not. He does, however, challenge Boorse’s claim that human variation falls within a narrow range 
for most trait types. Amundson terms this claim – “this statistical claim about functional diversity 
within species” – functional determinism (Amundson 2000, 35). In agreement with Cooper (see Section 
3.1.2), he points out that the human species is home to a dizzying assortment of anatomical and 
physiological makeups (ibid., 39-45). Moreover, he asserts that many of these bodily makeups are 
viable even though they are dramatically different from one another. Just because an individual’s 
body is not “normal” or “statistically typical” does not mean that it is unhealthy, per se: many 
atypical bodies and functional styles can be healthy, e.g., getting around using a wheelchair if one 
has lost use of their legs (ibid., 47-51). Amundson acknowledges that he cannot refute Boorse’s 
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functional determinism directly, since its veracity depends on empirical facts rather than conceptual 
analysis (ibid., 37). Nonetheless, he refutes it indirectly using some key observations from two 
subfields of biology besides physiology: evolutionary biology and developmental biology (ibid., 36). 
For one, Amundson notes, “current evolutionary theory considers natural species to contain 
very large amounts of heritable variation” (ibid., 36). In other words, organisms of the same species 
are often genetically diverse. The human species in particular harbors a huge amount of genetic 
diversity: as Amundson observes, there is more genetic variation within the human species than 
there is within (and even between) many other species. As an example, he cites the fact that there is 
more genetic variation among humans than there is among the more than four hundred species of 
cichlid fishes in Lake Victoria, even though these cichlids possess a wide range of functional and 
genetic variety (ibid., 38). Human genetic heterogeneity does not directly contradict functional 
determinism, since genes are not the sole determinants of functional makeup. Indeed, the 
relationship between genes and actual functional makeup is highly variable and contingent upon 
environmental influences. But there are some connections between genes and functional design, 
since our genes code for all the proteins that make up our bodies. In summary, even if it were the 
case that humans are more or less physiologically uniform, this uniformity could not have resulted 
from genetic uniformity; humans are far from genetically uniform (ibid., 38). 
 Regardless of any human genetic diversity, even a single genome can give rise to an 
indefinite number of different functional designs, since organisms develop through plastic rather 
than fixed processes. Amundson remarks that developmental processes 
… are remarkably plastic and resilient to perturbation. If the genome actually were a set of blueprints 
or instructions for building a body, as some modern metaphors have it, the slightest perturbation 
would throw off the end result. Any embryo that could not be built to fit the determinate design 
would be non-viable. But in fact functioning adults can develop in an indefinitely large number of 
ways. The goal-directedness seen in developmental plasticity renders the concept of species design 
highly suspect. Development yields adults that function, but not adults that function identically. 
Functional diversity is a product of developmental plasticity (38-39). 
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 In other words, developmental processes are apparently directed towards certain goals or 
ends. In order to attain these goals, development can proceed in any of a huge array of ways, 
depending on internal and environmental circumstances. As such, developmental processes allow 
for any given genome to give rise to myriad functional makeups. This developmental plasticity 
applies both to the processes of ontogeny – that is, the processes by which an organism first takes 
form, e.g., as in embryonic development – and to the processes by which an organism adapts to its 
environment within its lifetime (ibid., 39). For example, an individual may compensate for a double 
leg amputation by developing a robust and muscular upper body in response to wheelchair use. An 
individual’s lung capacity may increase in response to repeated aerobic exercise. The optic vesicle in 
the human embryo usually induces tissue near it to differentiate into the lens of the eye; yet a 
functioning human lens can develop even if the optic vesicle is located at an unusual position on the 
head (ibid., 39).13 In short, human development does not tend towards one pre-determined 
“blueprint” (ibid., 38). Rather, it occurs plastically, allowing a person’s physiological makeup to 
change dynamically in response to environmental inputs in order to achieve certain ontogenic and 
adaptive goals. These goals – e.g., inducing the development of the lens of the eye, ensuring that the 
muscles are strong enough to do the things they need to do – are apparently more specific and 
smaller in scale than whole-organism design. We might think of developmental processes as a 
conglomeration of smaller goal-directed processes that are partly independent, partly interdependent 
upon one another, and partly responsive to environmental influences.14 Thus, the goal-directedness 
of life, one of the biological foundations of the BST, actually serves to refute Boorse’s theory. 
Considering the goal-directedness of organismal development, Amundson introduces a new 																																																								13	Amundson discusses six other notable examples of developmental plasticity (pp. 39-43), but I will not 
comment on them here for brevity’s sake. 14	In the tradition of Bechtel and Richardson, we might say that developmental processes are partly 
decomposable (Bechtel and Richardson 1993, Introduction p. xxix). Note that this footnote reflects my view 
of human development and not Amundson’s per se. 
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term to re-frame discussion of biological functions: “mode of function.” A mode of function is the 
exact physiological, molecular, or behavioral manner in which an organism achieves some biological 
goal, where “goals” are construed broadly to include not only individual S & R but also more 
specific goals such as obtaining food, fighting off threats, and maintaining homeostasis (ibid., 36). 
To clarify, “mode of function” is different from the BST’s notions of quantitative and qualitative 
function (see Section 3.1.2). “Qualitative function” has to do with the manner in which a trait 
contributes to individual S & R, and “quantitative function” has to do with the level or rate at which 
the trait makes that contribution to S & R. “Mode of function,” on the other hand, has to do with 
contributions to any organismal goal – not just individual S & R. This term helps us to make sense of 
the many ways in which a viable human can develop. As we have seen, developmental processes 
generate body parts and systems that allow organisms to achieve the same biological goals in 
qualitatively and quantitatively different ways, depending on the organism’s environment, gross 
anatomy, life experiences, etc. We may say that these different manners of achieving the same 
biological goal constitute different modes of functioning. In short, development gives rise to different 
modes of functioning with respect to the same (or nearly the same) goals. 
 Amundson illustrates a handful of cases in which people achieve characteristically human 
biological goals using atypical modes of function. For example, many people attain average or 
above-average levels of intellectual and emotional functioning even though they possess less than 
10% the average amount of brain tissue (ibid., 40-41). Some people with severe neuromuscular 
injury undergo surgery to take nerve endings from one set of muscles and connect them to another 
set. Many of these patients eventually adapt to the mixed-up neuromuscular connections, thereby 
regaining normal levels of physical functioning through an atypical mode (ibid., 41). People who 
cannot hear or speak achieve normal levels of interpersonal functioning by using sign language 
(ibid., 42-43). In other words, people with atypical levels of brain tissue can think and feel; people 
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with atypical neuromuscular connections can move their bodies in the way they need to; and people 
without speech can communicate using nonverbal language. These observations support 
Amundson’s claim that human development tends towards certain goals more specific than 
individual S & R. Moroever, they call into question Boorse’s claim that statistically normal function 
is necessary for health, or at least for happy and self-sufficient living. 
 Thus, Amundson shows (1) that Boorse’s claims about functional determinism are doubtful, 
and (2) that statistically normal function is not necessary for high levels of day-to-day functioning or 
a fulfilled life. Human physiology is too diverse for the BST to make neat distinctions between 
normal functioning and sub-normal functioning: considering the multitude of genetic and 
developmental makeups that a person can inhabit, it seems dubious that any tidy model of 
statistically normal physiology will capture most members of the human population, or, if it does, 
that it will be coherent or illuminating. Furthermore, people can function adequately (or even 
unusually well) in day-to-day life using atypical modes of physiological and behavioral functioning.15 
Therefore, the BST’s notion of statistically normal physiology does not seem to capture an intuitive 
meaning of “health,” nor does it provide a serviceable or biologically accurate set of criteria for 
distinguishing unhealthy conditions from healthy ones. 
Boorse may cede that statistically normal physiological functioning does not perfectly 
capture “happy and self-sufficient living” or “adequate day-to-day functioning.” However, he would 
counter that these ideas are distinct from medicine’s theoretical concept of “health.” Boorse seeks to 																																																								15	It is important to note that Amundson uses the word “function” in two different ways (indeed, I have used 
both of them in the footnoted sentence): (1) in reference to biological functioning, and (2) in reference to 
one’s, “personal functioning,” or her ability to get by in her everyday life (e.g., “She seems to be functioning 
just fine in her new assisted living environment”). When Amundson talks about “mode of function,” he 
apparently means to talk about biological functions, broadly conceived – from the small-scale functions of 
enzymes and hormones, to the functions of organs and organ systems, to the functions of gross anatomical 
shapes and behaviors (see Section 1). When he talks about “level of function,” on the other hand, he generally 
seems to be talking about how well one can do the things she needs to do to get through the day – how self-
sufficiently, efficiently, and painlessly a person can live. This dual usage of the word “function” does not seem 
to cause any great conceptual confusion. 
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pin down the theoretical definition of “health” as used by academic physicians and pathologists to 
classify states of the body as “diseased” or not (Boorse 2014, 711-712). As such, Boorse maintains 
that a successful definition of “health” will categorize as diseases all or nearly all the conditions that 
pathologists consider pathological, and will categorize as “healthy” all or nearly all the conditions 
that pathologists consider healthy. Moreover, many of the conditions that are widely considered 
pathological do not affect people’s self-sufficiency or day-to-day functioning. For one, some 
ostensibly pathological conditions do not usually create large enough disturbances to affect an 
individual’s everyday life: e.g., plantar warts, eczema (Boorse 1977, 564). Some supposedly 
pathological conditions may not yet affect a person’s daily living, but will eventually if they are 
allowed to linger: e.g., intestinal polyps, skin cancer (ibid., 564). Indeed, Boorse believes that one of 
the strengths of the BST is its ability to recognize “latent asymptomatic diseases” such as these 
(ibid., 564). According to this desideratum, neither “practical self-sufficiency” nor “adequate day-to-
day functioning” matches exactly with the theoretical definition of “health,” since a person can be 
perfectly self-sufficient even if she has apparently pathological conditions such as warts or 
asymptomatic cancers. Furthermore, Boorse might reason, just because an individual can live 
happily and self-sufficiently with nonfunctional legs or autism does not mean that these conditions 
are not diseases. We might say that people can live good lives in spite of having autism or 
nonfunctional legs. Thus, even though statistically normal physiology does not encompass practical 
self-sufficiency or day-to-day functioning, yet this criticism does not mean that it fails to capture the 
definition of “health.” 
To respond to this objection requires more conceptual resources than Amundson (2000) has 
provided us. In fact, this objection gets to the heart of my disagreements with Boorse’s 
philosophical approach to “health” and “disease.” In Chapters II and III, I will develop the tools we 
need to combat this objection; these concepts will become part of the core of my own account of 
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“health” and “disease.” 
All in all, I believe that Amundson’s most damning criticisms concern the BST’s social 
implications (see Section 3 below), rather than its biological worldview. For now, though, we will 
simply recall that Amundson has demonstrated that Boorse’s claims about functional determinism 
are implausible: human physiology is far from uniform, owing to genetic variation and 
developmental plasticity. By circumscribing “health” within a narrow range of physiological 
makeups, the BST fails to capture the diversity of viable human variation. Amundson summarizes 
this misconception about biology: 
 …the goal-directed processes of biological development are not finely tuned towards the production 
of functionally identical species members. Their inherent flexibility can be expected to generate a rich 
diversity of functional modes” (43). 
 
 I hope for my account of health and disease to accommodate this diversity of functional 
modes, rather than to relegate all atypical modes of function to the realm of “disease.” 
 
3.2.2 Statistically Typical Diseases & Cambridge Changes 
 
 Briefly, Boorse acknowledges in his second rebuttal paper that the BST does not have a 
good way of handling “typical diseases” – that is, diseases that are statistically typical in the human 
population (Boorse 2014, 705-707). For example, suppose that there were a pandemic in which 
more than half the world’s population was afflicted by an infection that significantly depressed 
kidney and liver function. Suddenly, levels of kidney and liver function that were once “abnormally 
low” would now be statistically normal, and therefore “healthy” – even if they greatly reduced an 
individual’s chances of S & R as compared to what was statistically normal before the pandemic 
struck! 
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J. David Guerrero observes that such a swing in statistically normal levels of function would 
cause so-called “Cambridge changes” in the BST’s health and disease designations: that is, changes 
in a person’s status as “healthy” or “diseased” due to changes in what is statistically normal (and, 
therefore, what is by definition “healthy” on the BST) rather than to any changes in the person’s 
actual physiology (Guerrero 2010, 272). Thus, our pandemic might cause the kidneys of an 
individual with chronic kidney failure to change from “diseased” to “healthy” solely because of 
changes in what is statistically normal. This result is manifestly erroneous. We would not want to call 
an individual with chronic kidney failure “healthy” merely because there has been a catastrophic 
spread of kidney dysfunction. On the contrary, we would want to say that this individual has a 
kidney disease, and that now most others do too! 
Ultimately, Boorse is flatly unable to contrive a response to these problems with the BST. 
“To the problem of typical disease,” he admits, “I see no solution but to retreat to a concept of ideal 
design which, so far, I am unable to define” (Boorse 2014, 707). In other words, Boorse guesses that 
the only way to avoid the problem of statistically typical diseases and Cambridge changes in disease 
status is to define “health” in terms of some ideal or theoretical model of human physiology. This 
kind of “ideal” model of physiology would not change in response to changes in what is statistically 
normal for humans. Ostensibly, then, it would prevent us from deeming “healthy” conditions that 
strike us as textbook cases of disease simply because most people happen to have them – e.g., high 
blood pressure, tooth decay, and minor lung inflammation (Boorse 1977, 567). 
In fact, my solution to these problems will involve something resembling a design 
specification. In particular, my notion of “health” will depend on a definite set of normative 
principles about the kinds of day-to-day functions that are characteristically human, and my 
reference classes will be fixed in part by these normative values. However, my approach will differ in 
many ways from what Boorse probably has in mind. As we have seen, it seems that Boorse’s 
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provisional notion of “ideal design” entails some kind of model physiological design that is 
impervious to short-term trends in human physiological function. On the contrary, my account of 
health and disease will hold as constant certain abstract functions that I believe are foundational to 
living a fully human life – e.g., communicating with other people. I call these abstract functions 
“basic physical capabilities.” I believe that “health” permits of several different ways of fulfilling 
these basic physical capabilities. As we have seen, we can fulfill the capability of “communicating 
with other people” by talking, signing, feeling braille, reading text, etc. All these various modes of 
fulfilling this abstract function are equally “healthy” in themselves.16 An individual cannot be 
healthier solely in virtue of the fact that she communicates vial talking rather than, say, signing. 
Similarly, an individual cannot be “diseased” solely in virtue of the fact that he moves around using a 
wheelchair instead of his legs. 
I will explore these ideas more fully in Chapter III. For now, we will be content with noting 
that the problem of statistically typical diseases demonstrates that a successful theory of health will 
have to appeal to some notion of human functioning beyond statistical typicality. 
 
3.3. Not Viable in Practice 
 
3.3.1. Not a Viable Model for Treatment 
 
 If it were implemented as a model for medical practice, the BST would have harmful effects 
on individual health and quality of life, both at the physiological and the societal level. Many 																																																								16	Thus, my idea of basic human capabilities makes use of Amundson’s notion of “mode of function”: 
human functioning should be judged in terms not of physiology, but rather in terms of whether an individual 
has certain abstract, day-to-day capabilities. An individual’s exact mode of functioning – that is, the precise 
physiological systems that she uses to perform each capability – does not make her intrinsically more or less 
healthy.	
	 48 
treatments that attempt to restore normal function actually make people’s lives unnecessarily 
difficult. Amundson presents several cases exemplifying this fact. Autistic children, for instance, are 
often discouraged from “stimming” – that is, performing “small repetitive self-stimulations like 
rocking while sitting, tapping one’s face, or flipping fingers in front of one’s eyes” – ostensibly 
because it is an abnormal behavior (Amundson 2000, 50). For many autistic people, however, 
stimming can be highly beneficial. Autism characteristically involves experiences of “sensory 
overload,” or of being overwhelmed by sensory input in “normal” environments. Stimming allows 
autistic persons to focus their attention when they are inundated by sensory information, thereby 
helping them to function more effectively in their day-to-day lives (ibid., 50). To give another 
example, Amundson cites the treatment of people whose legs fail to function normally. People with 
subnormal leg function are often encouraged to avoid using a wheelchair even if walking proves 
painful and slow for them, and even if using a wheelchair would massively improve their day-to-day 
functioning (ibid., 50-51). Amundson encapsulates these cases succinctly: 
Atypical people can function at their highest level using atypical modes of function. Mainstream 
concerns with normality are directed at typicality of functional mode, and are antagonistic to the 
functional performance of atypical people (ibid., 50). 
 
 Thus, people with atypical “global” or “overall” modes of function often benefit more from 
treatments that help them achieve the highest level of functioning possible with their unique modes of 
function, than they do from treatments that seek to make their overall mode of function more typical. 
In other words, the best treatments often work with a person’s overall mode of function, seeking to 
maximize the person’s day-to-day functioning with that particular mode of function, rather than 
attempting to supplant their mode of functioning with a more “normal” one. There are two 
important details to note about this observation. First, Amundson adverts to a mysterious and 
unanalyzed notion of “overall level of functioning,” or “level of day-to-day functioning.” 
Apparently, the kind of “function” Amundson invokes here is different than the notion of 
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“physiological function” that Boorse builds into the BST. Amundson’s idea of “function” seems to 
mean something like “personal functioning”: being able to do the things one needs to do to get by. 
In Chapter III, I will flesh out more fully what I think Amundson means when he appeals to 
“overall level of functioning.” I believe that we can measure a person’s overall level of functioning in 
terms of whether that person has all of the “basic physical capabilities” necessary for a fully human 
life – all of the abstract capabilities foundational to human achievement, e.g., the ability to 
communicate, the ability to plan and reason (see also the last two paragraphs of Section 3.2.2). 
 Notice also that Amundson calls an individual’s unique physical and mental approach to life 
their mode of functioning. I will formalize this notion of “mode of function” in Chapter III. 
 In summary, then, the Applied BST would be less than optimal, and in many cases positively 
harmful, as a guide to medical treatment. Promoting physiological and behavioral normality can 
inhibit the flourishing of people with atypical overall modes of functioning. 
 
3.3.2. The Societal Injustices of “Normal Function” 
 
 In “Against Normal Function,” Admunson draws special attention to the ways in which 
privileged groups use the doctrine of “normal function” to justify the oppression of people with 
atypical and unfashionable modes of function (ibid., 33, 51). In essence, Amundson contends that 
“species-normal function” is a discriminatory and falsely objective social norm based in phony 
biology (see Section 3.2.1). According to Amundson, “species-normal function” is analogous to the 
phony biological concept of “race,” which white Europeans used for centuries to justify the 
oppression of nonwhites. In much the same way that whites have rationalized the subjection of 
nonwhites by appealing to the idea that certain races are “naturally” inferior, privileged people have 
frequently rationalized the reduction in opportunity experienced by people with atypical modes of 
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function by labeling them as “abnormal” or “disabled,” and by claiming that their loss of 
opportunity is the fault of their mode of function (ibid., 33-34, 51-52). “Like the concept of race,” in 
Amundson’s words, 
…the concept of biological normality is invoked to explain certain socially significant differences, 
such as unemployment and segregation. Like the concept of race, the concept of normality is a 
biological error. The partitioning of human variation into the normal versus the abnormal has no 
firmer biological footing than the partitioning into races. Diversity of function is a fact of biology 
(ibid., 34). 
 
 In short, the societal notion of normal function is used to lend legitimacy to ableism.17 
Amundson refutes the concept of normal function in two ways: (1) by demonstrating the biological 
implausibility of the principle (as we have seen in Section 3.2.1), and (2) by showing that 
opportunities of people with atypical modes of function are diminished by the conscious choices of people 
in power, rather than by the modes of function themselves. As such, we should be cautious about 
using biological normality as a consideration in matters of medical treatment, politics, and social 
justice. 
 Amundson builds his case against the societal concept of normal function by stringing 
together several general observations about human functioning. Most importantly, what an 
individual can do depends not only on her biological makeup, but also on her environment (ibid., 51) 
and the tools at her disposal (ibid., 45). Amundson emphasizes that this dependency on 
environment and tools applies not merely to people with atypical modes of function, but to all 
humans. “Human beings are distinctive among species in their extensive use of tools and in the 
degree to which they modify their environment,” he points out.  
A weak person using an atlatl can throw a spear farther than a strong person without one. A weak 
person can walk faster on pavement than a strong person can walk on a sandy beach. Such 
improvements are entirely typical of human beings, in the statistical sense that everyone does them. 
Tool use and environmental design change the modes and levels of human function (ibid., 45). 
 
 Thus, we all rely on certain tools and environmental modifications to achieve our everyday 																																																								17	“Ableism” is a name for discrimination based on mode of function, similar to “racism” or “sexism.” 
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goals. For example, I live in a house, which shields and protects me from the wind, rain, and snow. 
My house is equipped with a heating unit, which keeps me from dying of hypothermia when it is 
cold outside. I use shoes to walk on snow, pavement, and dirt; a computer to write emails and type 
essays; a phone to stay in touch with my friends and family; weights to exercise; my coffee machine 
to make coffee, which ensures that I stay awake throughout the day; and antidepressant drugs to 
keep my outlook bright and shiny (the latter two artifacts constitute no small dependency for me!). 
Thus, even people with fairly “normal” modes of functioning rely on a barrage of tools and 
environmental modifications to get through each day. 
 Moreover, as Amundson points out, the tools and environmental modifications we use are 
the result of conscious choices (ibid., 47-48). There is nothing inevitable, coincidental, or merely 
“natural” about the fact that I wear shoes in the snow rather than, say, skis, nor about the fact that I 
use antidepressant drugs and coffee rather than methamphetamines, a computer rather than smoke 
signals or stone engravings, a house rather than a boat, or weights rather than heavy bags of sand. In 
each case, the kinds of tools and environmental modifications I use to achieve my purposes and 
goals are a result partly of choices I have made – e.g., choosing to get stronger by lifting weights 
rather than bags of sand – and largely of choices that people in my community and society have 
made – caffeine and Prozac are legal and societally accepted whereas methamphetamines are not, 
computers are a far more common and readily available means of word processing than stone 
engravings. 
 As such, if people with atypical modes of function suffer from lowered opportunity in life – 
most apparently, people with physical and mental disabilities, traditionally conceived – we cannot 
immediately blame their biological makeup for these disadvantages. In many cases, people with 
atypical modes of function are disadvantaged (a) because they do not have access to the right tools, 
or (b) because their environment is not well suited to their particular mode of function. For 
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example, a person who uses a wheelchair experiences reduced opportunity only to the extent that 
her environment does not accommodate wheelchairs. If her home, workplace, and means of 
transportation are wheelchair-accessible, and if she does not experience ableist discrimination in 
hiring and employment, then ostensibly she will function well; if her environment is not wheelchair-
accessible, and if her community is prejudiced against her mode of function, then she will not (ibid., 
50-51). Blind people will experience a devastating loss of opportunity if they have no access to 
braille writing, as they will be largely cut off from written communication. But blind people with 
access to braille will experience little or no loss of opportunity in the realm of literacy. Moreover, as 
we have seen, whether people with atypical modes of function have access to the right tools, and 
whether their environment accommodates their mode of function, results from people’s conscious 
choices. Our communities can choose, if they want, to make buildings wheelchair-accessible. We have 
the power to institute braille writing where it is most helpful to blind people, to modify our views so 
that stimming becomes socially acceptable, and to adapt our educational system to account for 
people who sign rather than speak. Loss of opportunity does not arise from biology: it arises from 
societal discrimination, from catering to the needs of one group over others. In the case of people 
with disabilities, loss of opportunity results from the reification of biological “normality” and the 
shunning of unpopular modes of function (ibid., 33). Amundson summarizes this point thusly: 
… the discussion of opportunity takes a very different form in the context of supposed biological 
abnormality than in other contexts. Racism and sexism, for example, cause very serious reductions in 
opportunity. Moral discussion of these problems centers on how opportunity should be restored to 
the disadvantaged groups, by changing social institutions if necessary. We are well past the time when 
academic discussion of race and sex was centered on rationalizations of how the disadvantages 
experiences by certain races and genders were caused by nature itself. But the normality discussions 
do just that. The abnormals are said to be disadvantaged by nature itself… [yet] the present unequal 
distribution of opportunities among people with varying biological traits can only appear to be fixed 
by nature if we ignore the fact that all human beings use tools and live in built environments, and that 
the design of tools and environments is an outcome of human choices. Given the appropriate 
technology and environment, blind people can read and paralyzed people can be mobile. The 
disadvantage that attaches to blindness and paralysis derives not from the atypicality of one’s biology, 
but from the absence of appropriate tools and environments (ibid., 47-48). 
 
 In short, the glorification of “normal function” results in and reinforces the maltreatment of 
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people with atypical modes of function, just as the fabrication of biological differences in race and 
sex have been used to justify the oppression of nonwhites and women. If we are to treat atypical 
people with the respect and consideration they deserve, we must shift our dialogue away from the 
supposed “inherent shortcomings” of atypical modes of function, away from how we can make 
atypical people more like “normal” people. Instead, we must discuss how to restore opportunities to 
people with atypical modes of function by providing them with the tools and environmental 
modifications they need to function at the highest level they can, given their atypical modes of function. 
 Amundson’s line of argument stops here: he does not attempt to formulate a set of 
principles or guidelines as to (1) how we should measure a person’s overall level of functioning, 
regardless of mode, (2) how we can better approach the medical treatment of people with atypical 
modes of function, (3) what kinds of abstract abilities or capabilities we should prioritize when 
deciding how to modify our environment, or (4) how we can tailor our environments and tools to 
enable people with different modes of function to perform these capabilities. In Chapter III, I 
intend to take up the torch and build a theory of “basic physical capabilities” that can answer these 
questions in a clear and organized way. 
 
3.4. Physiology is Too Narrow a Basis for “Health” and “Disease” 
 
 To conclude, I wish to make a few quick remarks about the BST’s purported basis in 
physiology. Since Boorse first formulated the BST in 1977, biology and medicine have undergone 
several rapid and dramatic changes in worldview. Since 1977, we have mapped the entire genomes 
of humans and myriad other species. We have conclusively dismissed the notion that race has any 
basis in biology (ibid., 33-34). We have uncovered the cellular and molecular bases of a virtually 
incomprehensible number of bodily processes, from gene transcription to cell signaling to aging and 
	 54 
development to cognition and emotion. The fields of genetics, epigenetics, neuroscience, cognitive 
science, biostatistics, epidemiology, and bioinformatics have exploded, and their unique 
methodologies have become widespread. In turn, these changes have revolutionized the way we see 
medicine. We have begun to pioneer medical treatments that target not only the patient’s physiology, 
but also the patient’s genome and epigenome (Sweatt 2013). As medicine continues in the coming 
years to bleed over into these new fields (not to mention fields that we have not thought of yet), we 
will need principles of medicine that encompass more levels of biological organization than that of 
physiology. We will need to take into account the molecular, genetic, epigenetic, biochemical, 
cellular, neural, cognitive, and behavioral levels of organization as well. As such, our theory of health 
and disease must be more conceptually inclusive than the BST. 
 As we have seen, moreover, the BST’s notion of health as physiological normality is far too 
narrow to encompass the vast range of healthy diversity in human functioning. In order to allow 
enough slack for modes of functioning besides the “normal” one, we must build a theory that 
defines health in terms of a level of organization higher and more abstract than physiology – in 
terms of the higher-level goals that all or nearly all people pursue, regardless of their anatomical, 
physiological, and genetic makeups. My account of health as capability will do just this. 
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Chapter II 
Human Goals Relevant to Health 
 
“The link between normality and opportunity may help us recognize the hierarchical level at which biological normality 
is conceived to operate. A person with unusually low blood pressure, or an unusual muscle configuration in the hand, 
may experience no direct loss of opportunity… But people who are blind or paraplegic do experience a reduction of 
opportunity. It is probably at this level, the level of ‘basic personal abilities’ that draws the functional determinist’s 
attention…” (Amundson 2000, 46). 
 
  The concept of “health” is richer, subtler, and more human than mere physiological 
normality. As we have seen in Chapter I, Christopher Boorse’s (1977) notion of “health” as 
statistically normal physiological functioning with respect to one’s species, sex, and age is too coarse 
to deal adequately with many types of healthy bodily variation. In the next two chapters, I will show 
how we can reinterpret the biological goals relevant to health to account for this healthy variation. 
In this chapter, I contend contrary to Boorse (see Boorse 1977, 556) that survival and 
reproduction (“S & R”) are the wrong kinds of biological goals in terms of which to define health. I 
argue that we can best think about health as the ability to perform certain everyday functions, such 
as communicating with other people, moving from place to place, using our imagination, planning, 
and remembering. In the style of Martha Nussbaum (2000), I call these day-to-day abilities basic bodily 
capabilities.  
 
1. Shortcomings of Individual Survival and Reproduction 
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The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate why individual survival and reproduction 
a la Boorse is the wrong goal in terms of which to define “health.” In order to show why I disagree 
with Boorse’s definition of “health,” I want to mention briefly how my philosophical aims differ 
from his. In short, whereas Boorse’s main goal is to capture a theoretical definition of “health,” 
mine is to capture a practical one – a definition that tells us not only what health is, but also what 
kinds of treatments promote health, when they should be administered, and who should be 
responsible for financing them. (I discuss this difference in philosophical aims more completely in 
the Introduction.) With this divergence in mind, let us examine how individual survival and 
reproduction fares as a goal of clinical practice.  
Imagine that we have a young adult in a coma. Suppose that her family pays to keep her on 
life support indefinitely. Suppose further that her medical team makes no great effort to restore her 
consciousness or her mental and physical faculties, per se, but they keep her unconscious body alive 
for decades until she dies of natural causes at the age of eighty-five. Moreover, suppose that 
someone decides to harvest her eggs and use them for in vitro fertilization. At the time that she dies, 
this individual has several biological children, grandchildren, and even great-grandchildren. In terms 
of survival and reproduction, the individual’s life has been overwhelmingly successful: she has 
produced many descendants and lived longer than most others. As such, this individual’s medical 
team has succeeded in promoting her individual S & R. 
Yet it does not seem that this individual possessed “health” during her adult life in any but a 
trivial sense of the word. She never woke up from her coma, never got up and walked around, never 
consumed food or expelled bodily wastes without the aid of technology or assistance, never learned 
anything new, never had another sensory experience, never communicated with another person. 
Thus, even though she reproduced and survived to old age, we would not consider her to have lived 
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an “adult life” at all, let alone a healthy one. To the extent that it was possible to restore her 
consciousness, her medical team has failed her. 
This hypothetical story illustrates that individual S & R is neither (1) sufficient for health, nor 
(2) the only goal of healthcare. Healthcare professionals usually work to help their patients attain 
more than just baseline S & R, and we expect them to do so, otherwise the above story would not 
strike us as such a devastating failure. It is not enough for our healthcare providers to ensure that we 
live a life of a normal length and produce offspring. Intuitively, we would think that they should 
help us attain other bodily goods as well. If we are in pain, we expect that our healthcare providers 
will help us to overcome or to weather it. If we cannot move, we expect that our healthcare 
providers will do something to restore movement to our bodies, or to give us compensatory 
medicine or technology – e.g., a wheelchair. If we have a tumor that threatens to diminish our ability 
to see, we expect our doctors and nurses to try and fix it. Individual S & R are blunt biological 
measurements: they are useful in evolutionary biology, but not in assessing whether a person is 
healthy or whether she has lived a good life. 
Boorse would agree that mere S & R is not sufficient for “health.” According to Boorse, 
“health” consists in all the parts of an individual’s body making statistically average or above-average 
contributions to her S & R (Boorse 1977, 555; see also Chapter II). Thus, even though the comatose 
woman in our story achieves better-than-average S & R, yet she does not qualify as “healthy” 
according to the BST. Several parts of her body – most conspicuously her brain, but perhaps also 
her muscles, eyes, ears, etc. – make significantly below-average contributions to S & R as compared 
with other adult women. So Boorse would agree with our verdict that this individual’s medical team 
has failed to restore her health. 
But Boorse’s own definition of “health,” that is, all parts of the body making statistically 
average or above-average contributions to individual S & R, still falls short of capturing both (1) 
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how healthcare professionals currently work and (2) how they should work, as I have discussed briefly 
in the Introduction.18 I will address each of these concerns in turn. 
When healthcare workers provide medical treatment, they often do so with an eye to 
maintaining or restoring normal physiological contributions to individual S & R. For example, a 
team of emergency room doctors and nurses may identify that a patient has unusually high blood 
pressure, and so provide medication to temporarily bring blood pressure back into a normal range. 
A family physician may observe that her patient has unusually high blood cholesterol and advocate 
changes in exercise, diet, and medication to lower the patient’s blood cholesterol. Thus, 
physiological normality figures as both an epistemic tool and a goal of treatment in contemporary 
healthcare. So Boorse’s account of “health” does capture a prevalent aspect of healthcare practice. 
Still, many healthcare professionals strive to promote more than just normal physiological 
contributions to S & R. I claim that there are two main ways in which contemporary healthcare 
practice promotes something other than statistically normal contributions to individual S & R. (1) In 
some cases, healthcare professionals work to restore physiological contributions to goals more 
specific than S & R. (2) In other cases, healthcare professionals seek to promote atypical, poorly 
understood, or unknown modes of function. 
To examine the first kind of case, I claim that healthcare professionals sometimes work to 
restore physiological contributions to goals more specific than individual S & R; some of these more 
specific goals may ultimately contribute to S & R, but others may not. For example, healthcare 
professionals may seek to restore an organ’s contribution to breathing, hearing, walking, blood 
circulation, digestion, etc., rather than its contribution to organismal S & R per se.  
																																																								18	These two considerations are not utterly contradictory: some current healthcare practices differ from what 
I believe they should look like, but others do not. That is to say, some aspects of contemporary healthcare are 
closer to my ideal than others. My goal is to promote a healthcare system that is unified and consistent in 
promoting people’s basic bodily capabilities. 
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To illustrate, suppose that I break my tibia and visit an urgent care clinic. The doctor wraps 
my leg in a cast and advises that I use a wheelchair to get around for a few weeks. Then, I will walk 
with crutches for a few weeks; then only with a boot; and finally my leg bone will be sufficiently 
healed that I can walk again with no assistance. Suppose that I follow this sequence of 
recommendations, and after several months my tibia is as good as new. In this case, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the doctor’s helping my tibia heal did restore the bone to a statistically 
normal level of contribution to S & R. But observe the form of the treatment I followed. Each step 
in the treatment aimed specifically to restore my tibia’s contribution to walking, rather than its 
contribution specifically to my S & R. Each stage brought me closer and closer to being able to walk 
without equipment; at each stage I made an incremental transition from not being able to walk on 
my own to being able to walk on my own. That is to say, even though the treatment happened to 
restore to my tibia a species-normal level of contribution to S & R, yet restoring the tibia’s 
contribution to S & R was not an explicit goal of the treatment. Rather, the treatment was tailored to 
restoring the tibia’s contribution to my ability to walk. 
One might object to this example that just because a treatment involves changes in my 
ability to walk does not mean that restoring my tibia’s contribution to walking was a goal of the treatment. 
In other words, just because a course of treatment restores a body part P’s contribution to ability X 
does not mean that restoring P’s contribution to X was the main purpose of the treatment. The 
same treatment would have also restored my tibia’s contribution to climbing ladders, tap dancing, 
stomping on balloons, riding a unicycle, and standing while I write papers, among an indefinite 
number of other apparently irrelevant activities. Alternatively, a heart transplant may reinstate the 
heart’s contribution to a patient’s ability to watch TV – i.e., by saving the patient from dying of heart 
failure – but restoring the patient’s ability to watch TV is not one of the main goals of heart 
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transplant surgeries. Perhaps, then, the treatment’s restoring my ability to walk was incidental to 
some other purpose. 
If the treatment’s restoring my ability to walk was indeed incidental to some other, more 
primary purpose, it is unclear what exactly that purpose would be. In any case, I do not see why we 
would assume a priori that the main purpose of the treatment was restoring my tibia’s contribution to 
S & R, rather than some other goal. For one, S & R is an abstract, high-level goal. As such, the 
connection between individual S & R and the functioning of the tibia is diffuse and multifaceted, 
mediated by the patient’s environment, the tools at the patient’s disposal, and myriad other of the 
patient’s body parts. Accordingly, the tibia’s contribution to S & R will be dependent upon so many 
other factors as to render it impractical as a clinical tool. For the sake of cognitive simplicity, as I see 
it, healthcare workers typically focus on contributions to more immediate goals than S & R – that is, 
to goals for which the relevant body part’s contribution is more direct and uncomplicated, less 
layered and multifactorial. For example, the tibia’s contribution to walking seems relatively 
straightforward: the tibia helps to support our bodyweight while we walk and serves as an 
attachment point for several skeletal muscles involved in walking (Drake et al. 2015, 618-632). Thus, 
when I break my tibia, my healthcare providers will focus on restoring the tibia’s contributions to 
walking rather than to S & R (even though restoring the tibia’s contribution to walking may also 
happen to restore its contribution to S & R). 
To be sure, other of the tibia’s functions may have peripheral roles in walking. For example, 
the interior of the tibia contains bone marrow, which contains the stem cells that generate new 
blood cells. Without sufficient red blood cells, our bodies might not be able to transport enough 
oxygen to our muscles to allow for walking. In the case of the broken tibia, however, the ability of 
stem cells inside the tibia to generate red blood cells will probably not be compromised; therefore, 
the stem cells inside the tibia will not figure centrally in diagnosis and treatment. This observation 
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reveals an important aspect of clinical practice: treatments are often designed to restore certain 
abilities that have become compromised by injury, infection, or genetics – or to maintain abilities 
that threaten to become compromised. In order to maintain or restore these abilities, clinicians focus 
on (1) identifying which parts of the body are making substandard contributions to the ability in 
question and (2) instituting procedures that will either (a) restore the contribution of those body 
parts to the ability, (b) restore the ability without restoring the contributions of the relevant body 
parts, or (c) allow for some different ability to supplant the one lost. An example of (a) would be the 
above treatment for my broken tibia. An example of (b) would be to prescribe a regular oral dose of 
thyroid hormone to someone whose thyroid has been surgically removed so that she can still 
regulate her body temperature, digest food, etc. And an example of (c) might be prescribing the use 
of a wheelchair for someone who has lost use of her legs, and thus who has lost the ability to walk.19 
To summarize, the treatment that a clinician provides depends on which abilities are compromised 
and which body parts and processes are responsible for compromising the ability, i.e., which parts 
and processes are making substandard contributions to that ability. 
So we have established that healthcare professionals frequently provide treatments that aim 
to restore the contributions of certain parts and processes of the body to goals more specific than S & R. 
These more specific goals may or may not ultimately contribute to S & R. I would like to make two 
comments on this conclusion: 
(1) I do not mean to say that clinicians never seek to restore the contribution of some body 
part or process to S & R. In fact, many medical treatments aim specifically to maintain survival or to 
restore or maintain reproductive functions. For example, suppose someone’s femoral artery 
becomes severed in an accident and a nearby paramedic rushes to help. The paramedic may insert 
																																																								19	See below for a more detailed discussion about how healthcare providers may promote atypical modes of 
functioning in cases of kind (c). 
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her finger into the victim’s femoral artery in order to prevent the victim from dying of blood loss. In 
this case, the paramedic’s inserting her finger into the artery aimed specifically to compensate for the 
femoral artery’s failure to contribute to survival in a way it usually does, i.e., by keeping blood 
contained within the cardiovascular system. 
(2) I have still not fully addressed one of the criticisms issued above: that just because a 
treatment happens to restore part P’s contribution to ability X does not mean that restoring P’s 
contribution to X is the main goal of the treatment. How do we know, for instance, that the 
treatment for my broken tibia aimed to restore the tibia’s contribution to walking, rather than its 
contribution to, say, jumping on a pogo stick? After all, the treatment restored the tibia’s 
contribution to both abilities, in addition to countless others. Perhaps the treatment’s restoring my 
tibia’s contribution to walking was incidental to some other purpose. 
I take the form or design of the treatment as evidence of the treatment’s purpose.20 In the 
case of the broken tibia above, I followed a sequence of treatments that allowed me to transition 
smoothly from not being able to walk at all, to being able to walk with crutches, to being able to 
walk with only a boot, to being able to walk independently again. The treatment was designed to 
gradually restore my ability to walk following the tibial fracture. It was not designed to restore my 
ability to hop on a pogo stick or stomp on balloons. I did not, for example, start in a wheelchair and 
transition to using a pogo stick with special pogo-restraints that reduce the weight-bearing load on 
the healing tibia, to using the pogo stick independently.21 Therefore, restoring the tibia’s contribution 
to these activities was not the main purpose of the treatment, even though the treatment did 
incidentally restore my tibia’s contribution to the activities. 																																																								20	The notion of “design” I appeal to here is the colloquial one: that is, conscious design by humans, and in 
particular by healthcare professionals. I am not referring to any more technical notion of biological design.    21	If I were extremely passionate about the pogo stick, then I might follow such a treatment. But I am not, 
and probably only a few people are; as such, this treatment is probably not a very common way to cope with a 
tibial fracture. 
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To provide further evidence for my claim that the design of the treatment reveals its 
purpose, consider how treatment for a tibial fracture might look different for someone who is 
paraplegic and uses a wheelchair to get around. In this case, the patient’s normal mode of 
locomotion may not include walking at all. As such, her treatment will not consist of a transition 
from wheeling to walking, since wheeling is her normal mode of locomotion in the first place. She 
will not have to walk with crutches or walk with a boot at any stage in the treatment; rather, she will 
be using a wheelchair at the beginning and the end of a treatment. So perhaps she will wear a cast 
for some time until the fracture has healed. In this case, it looks as though the primary purpose of 
the treatment is restoring the tibia’s structural integrity.22 Thus, even though the paraplegic patient 
and I would be treated for the same condition, the course of our treatments would look different 
because our mode of locomotion is different; we use our tibias in different ways.  
At this point, one may wonder how clinicians decide which of the body’s activities should be 
goals of treatment and which should not. Surely it would not make sense to administer treatment 
that restores the tibia’s contribution to walking if the patient is paraplegic. But with other activities 
the answer may be less clear. Why was my treatment for a broken tibia designed to restore my 
walking, rather than my ability to pogo stick? In current practice, I suspect that clinicians decide 
which activities are relevant based on a mix of several factors, including institutional standards of 
care; prevailing conventions; their education and experience; personal views about which behaviors 
are worthwhile and which are not; and the patient’s goals and circumstances, among probably 
numerous other considerations. These decisions may be entirely conscious and explicit, or they 
could be automatic and routine, ingrained by habit and convention. In Section 3 below, I will outline 
																																																								22	We might also think that restoring the tibia’s structural integrity was one of the goals of my transition from 
wheeling to walking. Either way, these examples illustrate that many medical procedures aim at goals more 
specific than individual S & R.	
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an account as to which of the body’s activities I believe should be universally considered relevant for 
treatment. 
In addition to providing treatments that focus on contributions to goals more specific than 
individual S & R, healthcare professionals sometimes provide treatments that promote statistically 
abnormal modes of function, as well as treatments whose effect on physiology is unclear. For 
example, psychiatrists often prescribe lithium to treat bipolar disorder, but the physiological 
mechanisms that make lithium an effective treatment for bipolar are not well established (Marmol 
2008). A healthcare worker may suggest that someone who becomes paraplegic after a spinal injury 
use a wheelchair to get around. This course of treatment both (1) leaves intact the legs’ statistically 
sub-normal contribution to S & R, and also (2) prescribes the use of a wheelchair, a decidedly 
atypical mode of getting around. 
In summary, then, the BST’s concept of “health” as statistically normal physiological 
function does not match up with the idea that the goal of healthcare is to promote health. Many 
contemporary medical treatments aim to restore contributions to goals more specific than individual 
S & R, such as breathing, walking, and sleeping. Moreover, many other medical treatments promote 
statistically abnormal, and even unknown, modes of physiological functioning. 
Boorse might counter that the BST is not supposed to be an account of medical treatment 
or the practical, everyday aspects of health. On the contrary, as we have seen in Section 1.1, Boorse 
insists that he means to define the theoretical concept of health (Boorse 1977, 542 and Boorse 2014, 
693). This theoretical concept says what health is, but nothing about what we should do about health 
(and its failure). That is to say, the BST makes no particular recommendation as to how we should 
pursue health, or whether we should even pursue it in the first place (Boorse 1977, 569). As such, 
this criticism – i.e., that the BST does not capture contemporary approaches to medical treatment – 
does not refute Boorse’s theory at all. Rather than demonstrating that the BST falls short as an 
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account of “health,” Boorse might contend that I have merely provided good reasons to believe his 
claim that the BST is not an account of practical health. 
In my view, however, the BST’s silence on medical treatment is a serious shortcoming: it does 
demonstrate that the BST fails as an account of health. There is no reason why anyone besides 
philosophers and academicians should care about theoretical definitions of “health” and “disease” if 
these concepts say nothing about treatment – if they give us no direction as to who should receive 
which treatments for which conditions, what kinds of outcomes these treatments are likely to have, 
which treatments are ameliorative and which are augmentative, etc. Concepts of “health” and 
“disease” that are purely theoretical – that have no conceptual connection to medical procedures – 
are just as useless to clinicians as they are to they patients that clinicians treat. 
Part of Boorse’s motivation for placing “health” and “disease” out of the realm of medical 
practice, I think, is to prevent us from labeling certain states as “diseased” simply because they are 
treated – e.g., calling pregnancy a disease because some doctors prescribe contraceptives, or calling 
the possession of a clitoris a disease because some people practice female genital mutilation (Boorse 
1977, 545-546 and Boorse 2014, 701-702). I agree with Boorse that this consideration is important. 
Boorse provides a valuable insight into the relationship between treatment and the concepts of 
“health” and “disease” by demonstrating that the extension of the concept of “disease” is different 
than the range of conditions that people treat (Boorse 1977, 545-546). There are some conditions we 
generally consider “diseases” that are currently untreatable, e.g., Creutzfelt-Jakob Disease, the 
human variant of mad cow disease. Conversely, there are many conditions that healthcare providers 
treat that we do not generally consider diseases. For example, cosmetic surgeons may provide 
treatments that mitigate people’s ugliness; yet ugliness is definitely not a disease. Boorse mentions 
several kinds of conditions healthcare professionals or others treat, but that seem to be textbook 
non-diseases. For example, 
	 68 
Unwanted fertility, unwanted pregnancy, male foreskins, sagging jowls, and small breasts are treated 
by medicine, yet never counted as pathological (Boorse 2014, 693). 
 
I reject any ‘cultural notion of health’ [Kovacs 1998, 35]. The fact that ‘the conscious goals of 
individuals and cultures’ include abortion and contraception [Kovacs 1998, 35] does not show 
pregnancy to be a disease and infertility to be health, any more than clitoridectomy and human 
sacrifice show a clitoris to be a disease and death to be health (Boorse 2014, 701-702). 
 
Among standard medical procedures are circumcision, cosmetic surgery, elective abortions, and the 
prescription of contraceptives… [But] one will search [the medical canon] in vain for such a disease 
as unwanted pregnancy, and it would be absurd to call foreskins on male babies-a part of normal 
male anatomy-an innate disease. The performance of sex change operations hardly makes male 
gender, or female, a disease. The fact is that physicians distinguish, even among conditions they treat, 
between some they consider pathological and others they do not” (Boorse 1977, 545-546). 
 
Nonetheless, just because “diseases” and “treated conditions” do not coincide perfectly does 
not mean that we cannot make useful connections between the two concepts. To be sure, I think 
that finding the right extension for the concept of “disease” is a worthwhile philosophical goal, and 
that Boorse makes a notable step towards this goal by showing that not all commonly treated 
conditions are diseases. However, in separating his definitions of “health” and “disease” from 
matters of medical practice, Boorse fails to address the more pressing issue regarding the many 
treatments he has mentioned: that is, providing normative grounds that will allow us to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate treatments. Boorse’s account accommodates how, for example, being pregnant 
and having a clitoris are not diseases. But his account gives no direction as to why it is acceptable for 
doctors to prescribe contraceptives, but unacceptable for them to perform FGM, even though both 
procedures apparently treat non-diseases. 
Boorse’s project of finding the right labels for bodily conditions is philosophically interesting 
but practically ineffectual. More than any theoretical definitions of “health” and “disease,” we need 
to develop a robust universal normative framework that will support us in our efforts to prevent 
sham treatments such as FGM wherever we find them, and, moreover, that will help us to 
distinguish legitimate treatments from illegitimate ones in more ambiguous cases. In other words, 
instead of burying our heads in the theoretical, I believe we urgently need to address the practical 
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issues surrounding the body and bodily health. As philosophers, we are well equipped to devise a 
sensible, coherent, and cosmopolitan set of principles to guide our thinking in matters of Western 
medicine, non-Western medicine, and bodily modifications in general. This set of principles should 
be able to say that some procedures legitimately treat a disease, other procedures legitimately treat a 
non-disease, and others yet are illegitimate (or even positively evil). 
Now, Boorse might agree that distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate treatments is a 
more urgent need than determining the extension of the word “disease.” He might also agree that 
delineating between legitimate and illegitimate treatments is a normative matter: that it requires 
evaluative principles as to what kinds of procedures are appropriate and what kinds are not. But he 
might object that “health” and “disease” are insufficient for this task, since they are “value-free 
theoretical notion[s]” – they simply describe kinds of states an organism’s body can instantiate 
(Boorse 1977, 542). Because the concepts “health” and “disease” are devoid of value, we cannot use 
them alone to decide on the legitimacy of medical procedures. 
To further illustrate what Boorse means when he calls health and disease “value-free 
theoretical notion[s],” consider the concept “wavelength of 470 nm” (ibid., 542). This concept refers 
to a property that different kinds of waves (e.g., electromagnetic waves) may possess. There is 
nothing normative, Boorse would say, about whether or not the wave has a wavelength of 470 nm. 
Whether or not an electromagnetic wave has a wavelength of 470 nm is a matter of fact: the wave 
either has that wavelength or it does not. That a particular wave has wavelength 470 nm does not tell 
us whether it is good that the wave has that wavelength, whether we should change the wavelength to 
something else, how we should feel about the wavelength being what it is, etc. Any judgments about 
the wave’s being 470 nm in wavelength, then, must come from somewhere besides the mere concept 
of “wavelength of 470 nm.” Similarly, we would not attempt to derive a theory of value based solely 
on the concept of “atom” or “norepinephrine”: these terms simply name kinds of entities in the 
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universe. In the same way, Boorse would claim, “health” and “disease” designate properties that an 
individual organism either has or does not. To try to use these concepts as a guide to whether certain 
medical procedures are appropriate, therefore, would be senseless.  
But health is not a theoretical concept in the same way as “atom,” “norepinephrine,” or 
“wavelength of 470 nm.” On the contrary, health is the normative ideal towards which healthcare aims 
or should aim. Rather than merely naming kinds of physical properties in the world, “health” and 
“disease” also carry normative content, much in the same way as do the terms “harmony” and 
“discord,” “good shape” and “bad shape.” To put the matter differently, calling a body “healthy” or 
“diseased” is similar to calling a building “structurally sound” or “structurally unsound”: the terms 
denote both (1) something about the object’s physical makeup, and (2) whether we think that this 
aspect of the object’s physical makeup is good or bad. In other words, the terms simultaneously 
name a kind of property and our attitude towards that property.23 
There is much more to the idea of “structural soundness” than simply whether we think the 
building’s structure is good or bad. In the same way, there is more to the normative concept of 
“health” than merely whether we think a particular condition is desirable or undesirable. Thus, the 
value-based concept of health that Boorse dismisses – that is, health as desirability and disease as 
undesirability – is grossly oversimplified (Boorse 1977, 544-545). In Section 3, I will outline in detail 
what I believe the normative concept of “health” consists in. 
Boorse might counter my claim that health is a normative concept by appealing to the 
ubiquity of the terms “health” and “disease” in the biological sciences. As Boorse observes, 
biologists frequently apply these terms to nonhuman organisms, including pets, livestock, plants, and 																																																								23	Boorse compares “health” and “disease” to the terms “life” and “death,” which he claims are also 
descriptive, empirical, and non-normative (Boorse 2014, 696-698). In my view, however, the relationship 
between the concepts “life” and “health” is akin to that between the terms “killer” and “murderer”: whereas 
the former term in the pair is more-or-less empirical, the latter term has both empirical and normative 
content. 
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microorganisms (ibid., 565). A plant biologist might talk about the health of a spruce tree. 
Entomologists might talk about diseases in grasshopper, butterfly, and bee species. Microbiologists 
speak of viral infections in bacteria. If health were a normative concept, Boorse might reason, we 
would expect for the terms “health” and “disease” to apply only in the domain of human values. For 
example, we might only call a farm cow “healthy” insofar as it can do certain things we value – e.g., 
yielding edible meat, providing companionship, running around in a rodeo. Yet, on the contrary, 
biologists and veterinarians use these terms to talk about many other aspects of living organisms, 
and about organisms in virtually every branch on the tree of life, regardless of whether any people 
care whether these organisms live or die. That biologists use “health” and “disease” to talk about 
individual organisms from all species, rather than just those species directly involved in human 
interests, serves as evidence that these concepts are theoretical rather than normative. “What a 
healthy hen or cow is like,” Boorse punctuates, “is a biological fact; it is not an economic one” (ibid., 
565). 
From the vantage point of philosophical conjecture, attributions of health and disease to 
nonhuman organisms may seem plausible. Indeed, biologists often talk about diseases that afflict 
bugs and trees; veterinarians certainly talk about the health of cats, horses, and guinea pigs. In 
myriad other cases, however, it does not make sense to talk about the “health” and “disease” of 
nonhumans in the same way that we talk about the health and disease of humans. I share with 
Boorse the view that our medical concepts of “health” and “disease” apply to individual humans, 
rather than groups or societies.24 But Boorse also claims that these concepts apply to individual 
nonhuman organisms (ibid., 565).25 This claim fares well only when we consider species whose 
normal functions all contribute to individual S & R, rather than some other goal. To illustrate, one 																																																								24	To see why, see Sections 2 and 3 below. 25	I recognize that this issue depends partly on the problem of biological individuals, but to address what an 
“individual” is in the first place is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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of the normal functions of a bee’s stinger is to deter intruders from entering the hive. But deploying 
the stinger typically causes the bee to die. Here, the normal function of the bee’s stinger – that is, 
stinging – contributes to the survival of the hive, but destroys the survival of the individual bee. 
Boorse would not want to say that a bee that cannot deploy its stinger is “healthy,” because this bee 
fails to perform one of its normal functions. On the other hand, performing the function of stinging 
leads almost invariably to the bee’s death. To give another example, in some species of cellular slime 
mold amoebae, individual amoebae must mass together to form tall “stalks” in order to disperse into 
the surroundings when nutrients become scarce. But this process works such that many of the cells 
at the bottom of the stalk die (Bonner 1982). So there are some organisms with normal functions 
that sacrifice individual survival for the sake of others. Consider another kind of case: that in which 
reproduction leads to death. In many species of spiders and insects, for example, one mating partner 
often cannibalizes the other after mating (see, e.g., Lawrence 1992, Xiao et al. 2015). For other 
organisms, such as the fruit fly, the very act of reproduction significantly increases the risk of 
individual death due to internal bodily factors (see, e.g., Sgrò and Partridge 1999). So individual 
survival and individual reproduction sometimes conflict. 
These cases demonstrate the difference between the worldviews of biology and medicine. 
Even though stinging, sitting at the base of a stalk, and the act of reproduction lead to death in bees, 
cellular slime molds, and male mantises, respectively, these functions nonetheless contribute to the 
evolutionary fitness of biological units different than the individual organism. Evolutionary 
biologists would fain call post-coital cannibalization in mantises “bad” or “unhealthy;” somehow or 
another, this behavior probably contributes to the survival of the mantis lineage. Thus, the 
worldview of biology places no premium on the wellbeing of individuals, per se. The medical 
worldview, by contrast, focuses largely on the survival and wellbeing of individuals. A good clinician, 
insofar as she is a clinician, would not intentionally allow a patient to die even if that patient’s death 
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would drastically increase the wellbeing and probability of survival for others in the patient’s 
community (or in the human species). Conversely, imagine we had a special veterinarian who 
communicates with bees. This veterinarian, insofar as she treats individual bees, would advise her 
bee patients to refrain from deploying their stingers for the good of their own “health.”26 By 
contrast, an evolutionary biologist who communicates with bees would not likely make the same 
recommendation.  
So the terms “health” and “disease” could not possibly apply for all organisms in all cases in 
the same way that they apply to humans. Rather, the medical concepts of “health” and “disease” 
apply only to the extent that we value the individual organism’s life. As such, we can properly and 
profitably apply these concepts to, e.g., pets, intelligent nonhumans, and livestock. Wherever we do 
not particularly value the individual organism’s life, I believe that we use the terms “health” and 
“disease” by analogy to their respective medical namesakes, and we use them only where the analogy 
holds, i.e., where the normal functions concerned contribute to individual S & R. To illustrate, 
suppose we have an individual slime mold amoeba, and no one particularly cares whether it lives or 
dies. Because we do not value this individual organism’s life, we cannot rightly apply to it the 
medical concepts of “health” and “disease.” However, we can still say, by analogy to these medical 
concepts, that the amoeba has a “disease” if one of the normal functions contributing to its S & R – 
say, the ability of certain enzymes to reduce oxidative damage – becomes compromised. On the 
other hand, we would not say that the amoeba has a “disease” if it only loses its ability to sit at the 
base of the stalk, since this function leads to the death of the individual amoeba. In summary, the 
range of application of “health” and “disease” to nonhuman organisms is far more limited than 
																																																								26	One can imagine a colony-wide “Stinging Kills” advertising campaign.	
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Boorse claims. We only call living things healthy or diseased to the extent that we value them as 
individuals.27 
Now that I have addressed the BST’s shortcomings with respect to current medical practice, 
I will demonstrate how it also fails to meet the more demanding considerations I have outlined in 
the Introduction. Namely, I will show that Boorse’s definitions of “health” and “disease” do not 
match with people’s conscious goals and values.  
 To begin, consider that if we were to ask patients why they seek out and purchase healthcare 
services, virtually none would answer that they hope to promote statistically typical contributions to 
S & R by their body parts of processes. Nor would they likely espouse a simpler version of this 
formula: e.g., hoping to make their body parts do what the average person’s body parts do. Now, 
just because people do not say that these are their goals does not mean that these are not actually 
their goals. Generally speaking, people seek healthcare because they want to be healthy. And, 
according to Boorse, statistically normal function is constitutive of health. Thus, Boorse might 
suggest that, insofar as people seek health, they do seek to promote statistically typical contributions 
to S & R by their body parts and processes, whether or not they can recognize or articulate this fact.  
But many people pursue “health” – whatever exactly they mean by the term – without 
pursuing statistically normal function. For instance, consider an individual who has lost use of her 
legs in an accident and uses a wheelchair to get around. Suppose she performs intense resistance 
training with her upper body; eats a wholesome and balanced diet; has a robust social life, with a 
handful of close family members and friends, as well as many personal and professional 
acquaintances; and composes music in her free time. Apparently, this individual is a specimen of 																																																								27	Although the medical concepts of “health” and “disease” apply to all individual organisms whose lives we 
value, yet these concepts are relative to species. The content of the concept “health” will be slightly different 
for a tree, say, than for a dog. In this thesis, I will focus exclusively on human health. However, we can apply 
the capability theory of health to nonhuman organisms as well. I discuss the “health” of nonhumans in 
greater detail in Section 3 below. 
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physical, intellectual, and emotional health. Even more, nearly all the parts of her body contribute at 
a statistically high level to her S & R. Yet her legs do not, and she has no intention of restoring 
normal function to them. And unless she restores normal function to her legs, according to Boorse, 
she can never be fully “healthy”; rather, she will have a permanent disease, i.e., the inability to use 
her legs for locomotion. According to the BST, therefore, this individual may strive for health with 
respect to most of her body parts, but she could not be striving for health with respect to her legs or 
her body as a whole. Thus, the BST’s definition of “health” does not fit exactly with what people 
strive for when they pursue “health”: people can strive for health even if they make no attempt to 
restore certain body parts or processes to statistically normal contributions to S & R. 
To give another piece of evidence for this conclusion, consider that many people’s conscious 
goals and values transcend individual S & R. People can wish to be healthy while engaging in 
activities that endanger their individual S & R. For example, many people perform aid work in areas 
affected by poverty and natural disaster. Some people risk their lives and even commit to death to 
further bigger goals – freedom, religion, equality, beauty, innocence, an ethnic group or nation, the 
wellbeing of progeny and loved ones, etc. But I would not want to say that these endeavors are 
inconsistent with health. To view the matter differently, consider that if army doctors really wanted 
to promote the S & R of their individual patients – i.e., soldiers – they would advise these soldiers 
not to engage in combat! Yet army doctors do no such thing. So both patients and physicians must 
be aiming at something different than individual S & R, or statistically typical contributions to S & R, 
when they engage in healthcare transactions. 
Even if patients do not aim to attain statistically normal function, per se, Boorse might 
counter that promoting statistically normal function will nonetheless help patients attain whatever 
their conscious goals are. In other words, promoting statistically normal function supports patients’ 
goals and values; therefore, contrary to my criticisms, the BST is consistent with patients’ goals. For 
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example, suppose that a patient’s lungs are delivering oxygen to her blood with such low efficiency 
that she cannot do many of the things she likes to do without getting out of breath: hiking, playing 
sports, dancing, building furniture, etc. By restoring her lungs’ contribution to S & R to a statistically 
normal level, then, we will ostensibly enable her to do these activities again. Or, suppose a patient 
has suffered his stroke, and that now his frontal lobe functions with particularly low efficiency – so 
low that he can no longer do his job, appreciate music, or talk coherently. If we could restore normal 
function to his frontal lobe, we would thereby restore his ability to do many of the activities he 
normally does. Thus, Boorse might conclude, supporting normal function is perfectly consistent 
with supporting patients’ goals. 
In fact, Ron Amundson addresses a series of claims similar to the above in his “Against 
Normal Function” (2000). Paraphrasing Norman Daniels (1985), Amundson summarizes the 
argument as such: 
… the preservation and restoration of normal function is a primary goal of health care… Abnormals 
have reduced opportunity, and so maintenance of normality is maintenance of opportunity. Health 
care sustains normality, and normality sustains opportunity. Normality is the crucial objective link 
between health care and opportunity. And since normality is determined by objective science, 
judgments based on it carry a high authority (Amundson 2000, 46-47).  
 
Put differently, Daniels claims that healthcare should aim to promote normal function 
because promoting normal function allows people to do the things they want to do. Amundson 
dismisses this line of reasoning on two accounts. For one, abnormal function leads to reduced 
opportunity only if a person’s available tools, built environment, and social situation prioritize 
normal modes of function over atypical ones (ibid., 47-48; see also Chapter II, Section 3.3.2 above). 
More damagingly to Boorse and Daniels, Amundson points out a variety of cases in which 
attempting to restore normal function actually hinders the patient’s ability to pursue her conscious 
goals and values (see also Section 3.3.1). For example, many schools in the 19th Century forbade deaf 
children from signing, teaching them instead to read lips and speak out loud. This method of 
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education trained deaf children to communicate in a manner more similar to the statistically normal 
one – that is, talking and listening – but ultimately made communication harder for these children. 
Deaf people communicate far more easily and efficiently with sign language than with speaking and 
lip-reading, which “are extremely difficult to learn and of marginal value for most profoundly deaf 
individuals” (Amundson 2000, 43). To consider the alternative, although teaching deaf children to 
sign would have promoted a statistically abnormal means of communication, yet it would have 
allowed the children to function at a higher level (ibid., 42-43). 
Boorse may object that these examples drag the BST beyond its intended realm of 
physiological normality and into the territory of behavioral normality. But it is not clear whether 
behavioral normality is distinct from physiological normality. Behaviors are physiological 
manifestations; each behavior relies on certain small-scale physiological occurrences. Moreover, 
certain behaviors and capabilities are inextricably tied with particular constellations of physiological 
functions. In order to read written language, for example, an individual generally must possess eyes 
that can focus light on the retina with precision. In turn, light-focusing eyes generally have a 
complicated physiological foundation involving neurons, photoreceptors, smooth and skeletal 
muscle cells, and connective tissue. Using a wheelchair engages different neuronal pathways and 
muscle groups than does walking with legs. Obtaining nourishment in the usual way involves 
different anatomical structures – mouth, salivary glands, esophagus, stomach, etc. – and 
physiological functions – salivation, olfaction, bile secretion, smooth muscle contraction – than does 
obtaining nourishment intravenously. Thus, many behaviorally normal functions require or generally 
involve normal physiology. As such, the distinction between behavioral normality and physiological 
normality is academic. We do not take the BST outside its intended range of application by applying 
it to behavioral functions. 
To give another example where restoring parts of a patient’s body to statistical normality is 
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detrimental to the patient’s wellbeing, many people whose mothers took thalidomide during 
pregnancy in the 1960s were born with malformed, nonfunctional, or absent limbs. When these 
thalidomide babies became children, educators and healthcare providers often discouraged them 
from getting around with a wheelchair. Instead, these children were given devices resembling legs, 
which allowed them to get around in a manner that was reminiscent of walking, yet slow and 
painstaking. When these children became adults, many began using wheelchairs, which enabled them 
to function at a much higher level in their day-to-day lives (ibid., 49). Thus, attempting to restore 
these patients to a more statistically typical manner of locomotion reduced their day-to-day 
functioning and in fact made locomotion unnecessarily difficult. 
Restoring one or a few parts of an organism to statistically normal function does not always 
make the organism healthier. Treatments that bluntly restore statistically normal function in only a 
handful of body parts ignore the overall structural and functional organization of the patient’s body. 
As such, these treatments may work poorly or even interfere with the rest of the patient’s 
physiology. As we have seen, attempts to teach deaf children to communicate verbally overlooked 
the simple fact that deaf people’s bodies are not often well suited to verbal communication. The 
ability to communicate verbally hinges largely on the ability to hear: thus, many people who are deaf 
but seeing communicate more efficiently using sign language than by speaking and reading lips. 
Promoting verbal communication is sensible only for patients whose bodily organization readily 
supports it; for those whose bodies do not, different communication styles may be far more 
effective. In general, treatments that promote statistically normal function neglect the fact that 
organisms are integrated wholes, and that changing one or two parts of a patient’s body to make 
these parts more statistically normal may not help the patient all. Indeed, this kind of procedure may 
even hurt the patient or put her through unnecessary hardship, especially if her body has an atypical 
overall functional organization. Notwithstanding the problem of statistically typical diseases (see 
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Chapter II, Section 3.2.2), Boorse may be right in claiming that a person with statistically normal 
function in all the parts and process of her body is healthy.28 But having each part of the body able 
to “perform all its normal functions on typical occasions with at least typical efficiency” is not the 
same as rendering a treatment to restore normal functional ability. 
In summary, promoting statistically typical contributions to individual S & R is not an 
acceptable goal for healthcare. For one, clinicians nowadays promote more than just statistically 
normal functioning. Sometimes they promote contributions to other goals, such as breathing, 
sleeping and walking. Other times, they promote abnormal modes of function, as in the prescription 
of wheelchair use, or unknown or poorly understood modes of function, as in the prescription of 
lithium for bipolar. Furthermore, patients do not generally aim to promote statistically normal 
contributions to S & R by their body parts and processes when they seek medical treatment; and 
receiving treatment that promotes normal function may actually hinder other of the patient’s goals. 
In the following chapter, I will outline Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach to 
international justice, which I use as a model for my account of “health” as capability. Then, I will 
present my account, and I will show how a focus on certain general capabilities – such as being able 
to move from one place to another, being able to communicate with other people, etc. – can solve 
some of the problems discussed in this chapter, and can also account for some additional subtleties 
of medical practice.  
 
 
 
 
																																																								28	Of course, I believe that this person’s physiological normality is incidental to her being healthy, rather than 
the reason why she is healthy. 
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Chapter III 
The Capability Approach 
 
 “I believe, however, that the human personality has a structure that is at least to some extent independent of culture, 
powerfully though culture shapes it at every stage… Desires for food, for mobility, for security, for health, and for the 
use of reason – these seem to be relatively permanent features of our makeups as humans, which culture can blunt, but 
cannot altogether remove” (Nussbaum 2000, 155). 
 
 In the previous chapter, I argued contrary to Christopher Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory 
(1977) that “health” involves goals more immediate and specific than survival and reproduction. In 
this chapter, I supplant the BST’s central goal of individual S & R with the notion of basic bodily 
capabilities: that is, concrete bodily abilities that are integral to living a fully human life. According to 
my account, whether an individual is “healthy” depends on whether her body has these basic 
capabilities. Medical treatments should focus on restoring, compensating for, and maintaining the 
contributions of an individual’s body parts and processes to these basic capabilities. 
 In order to develop my account of “health” in terms of basic human capabilities, I use 
Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach to international development as a template. More 
specifically, I use her list of “central human capabilities” (Nussbaum 2000, 78-80) as a guide to 
thinking about the kinds of bodily capabilities that are relevant to health – and, ultimately, to living a 
fully human life. Moreover, I demonstrate how my account of health in terms of basic physical 
capabilities fits into Nussbaum’s larger distributive justice framework: broadly, I see my account as a 
medical corollary to Nussbaum’s capability approach. In summary, my theory of health is 
simultaneously (1) a substantial remodeling of Boorse’s biostatistical theory (BST) that renders 
	 82 
“health” an evaluative concept, where the value ultimately comes from people’s actual values and goals in 
life, and (2) healthcare-oriented foundation to Nussbaum’s politically-oriented capability approach. 
 In Section 1, I provide some initial motivation for thinking about “health” in terms of 
capability, demonstrating how a focus on concrete capabilities, rather than on individual survival and 
reproduction (“S & R”), can solve some of the problems with Boorse’s account we discussed in 
Chapter II. In Section 2, I outline Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach to international justice, 
which I use as a model for building my account of “health” as capability. In particular, I describe 
Nussbaum’s motivations for constructing the capabilities approach, and I explicate the normative 
principles that underlie the approach, including the idea of a “truly human life” (Nussbaum 2000, 
72-73) or a life “worthy of the dignity of the human being” (ibid., 6). In Section 3, I present my list 
of basic bodily capabilities and explain why I chose the capabilities I did. 
 
1. Initial Considerations in Favor of Capabilities 
  
 In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that neither (a) individual S & R nor (b) statistically 
normal contributions to S & R are appropriate targets for clinical practice. In this section, I will 
provide some initial motivation for thinking about health in terms of what people can do with their 
bodies – that is, in terms of people’s concrete bodily capabilities – rather than in terms of 
physiological states. 
 In his “Against Normal Function” (2000), Ron Amundson protests the notion that health 
consists in normal physiological functioning. He claims, as we have just seen, that treatments meant 
to institute normal function can be unhelpful or even detrimental for people whose bodies have an 
atypical overall functional organization. Rather than focusing on the “mode, fashion, or style of 
function” – that is, the manner in which a biological function is performed (see Chapter I, Section 
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3.2.1) – Amundson suggests that our healthcare institutions should prioritize “level of functional 
performance,” or how well a person can perform certain functions, regardless of mode (Amundson 
2000, 48). Amundson does not explain clearly what “level of functional performance” means, which 
kinds of biological functions it applies to, or how we can measure it.29 We get a vague idea of what 
the term could mean, however, by looking at Amundson’s examples in which the patient’s highest 
possible level of functioning does not coincide with the normal mode of functioning. In some of these 
cases, treatments that make the patient’s mode of functioning more normal actually lead to a lower 
level of functioning. In the converse cases, treatments that promote an atypical mode of functioning 
enable the patient to function at a higher level. 
 We have already seen several of these kinds of cases. Many educators in the 19th Century 
barred deaf students from using sign language, encouraging them instead to speak and read lips, a 
practice called “oralism” (ibid., 43). Although this mode of communication is apparently closer to 
the “normal” one, speaking and listening, it does not allow profoundly deaf people to communicate 
as effectively as they would with sign language. In the 1960s, children with deformed or missing 
limbs were encouraged to get around using leg-like devices, which were cosmetically more “normal” 
but slower and more laborious to use than a wheelchair (ibid., 49). Today, autistic children are often 
discouraged from stimming, that is, performing repetitive motions that help with concentration (see 
Chapter I, Section 3.3.1). Although stimming is an atypical mode of concentrating, it leads to a 
higher level of concentration in autistic people than does the avoidance of stimming (ibid., 49-50). In 
each of these examples, as I see it, Amundson discusses different modes of performing certain 
“basic personal abilities” (ibid., 46) – certain day-to-day functions involving the whole person, such 																																																								29	Amundson’s does define mode of function and level of function, but these definitions are mysterious. “Functional 
mode,” he propounds, “is the manner in which a functional outcome or performance is achieved. 
Performance level is the quantitative degree of the functional performance, such as the speed or the strength 
of a motion (ibid., 36). It is not clear what “functional outcome” or “quantitative degree of functional 
performance” amount to. 
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as communication, “mobility,” and concentration (ibid., 50). The focus of healthcare, as Amundson 
advocates, should be helping people fulfill these basic personal abilities as best they can and in 
whatever manner they can, rather than forcing patients into one particular mode of performing these 
personal functions. 
 Thus, Amundson’s so-called basic personal abilities are multiply realizable. That is, each 
basic personal capability can be performed in a number of different ways, each way involving a 
unique complement of lower-level physiological functions. Take “mobility,” for example (ibid., 50). 
People can get around by walking with their legs. They can also get around by walking with their legs 
and using a walker for balance; or, they can use a wheelchair; they can walk with one or two 
prosthetic legs; they can ride in a boat; etc. Each of these modes of locomotion relies upon a 
different hierarchy of physiological functions. Walking with prosthetic legs, for example, does not 
involve the same neural and muscular connections as does walking with organic legs. Using a 
wheelchair uses different arm and leg muscles than walking with a walker.  
In Amundson’s view, then, we measure a person’s wellbeing not by their physiology, per se, 
but by whether they can perform certain day-to-day functions. Details about a person’s physiology 
are not always an illuminating measure of a person’s health because people live happy and fulfilled 
lives with an almost inconceivable variety of physiological makeups. Each of the personal abilities 
we use in our everyday lives – communicating with others, moving from place to place, planning 
future courses of action, recognizing objects in our surroundings – can be manifested with a variety 
of different physiological organizations, owing to the plasticity of biological development (ibid., 38-
39; see also Section 3.2.1). 
In this thesis, I will argue for a conception of “health” similar to Amundson’s, based in a 
normative principle of human flourishing or wellbeing. To that end, I will develop Amundson’s 
notion of basic personal abilities, outlining a more comprehensive list of personal functions that are 
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definitive of human health. As Amundson contends, these personal functions will be multiply 
realizable: each can be performed in a number of different ways, with a number of different kinds of 
bodily makeups. At the same time, I do not wish to call every condition “healthy,” nor do I want to 
legitimize just any medical treatment; I still want for my theory to say which conditions are diseases 
and which medical treatments are illegitimate. Thus, my account will expand the variety of 
physiological makeups we deem “healthy,” but it will still mark a distinction between health and 
disease. My approach is cosmopolitan with respect to “health,” but not relativistic. 
My search for an account of “health” and “disease” that will accommodate people’s 
multifarious ways of living hooks up nicely with Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach to 
international justice. In her Women and Human Development (2000), Nussbaum presents a set of so-
called central human capabilities: concrete abilities that are indispensable for living a live “worthy of the 
dignity of the human being” (Nussbaum 2000, 5). In particular, Nussbaum outlines ten central 
human capabilities, which range from the bodily – e.g., “being able to have good health” – to the 
intellectual – e.g., “being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life” – to the emotional – “being able to have attachments to things and 
people outside ourselves” – to the sociopolitical – e.g., “having the right of political participation, 
protections of free speech and association,” “having the social bases of self-respect and non-
humiliation” – to the ecological – “being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, 
plants, and the world of nature” (ibid., 78-80). Nussbaum is interested mainly in promoting the 
sociopolitical foundations for the central human capabilities: according to Nussbaum, these 
capabilities are the primary political good that governing bodies should work to secure for their 
citizens (ibid., 81-82). In this sense, Nussbaum sees central human capabilities as analogous to John 
Rawls’s primary social goods (ibid., 75, 88-89; Rawls 1971). 
Amundson is similarly concerned about the sociopolitical bases of “basic personal abilities,” 
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but his basic personal abilities are apparently more limited in scope than Nussbaum’s central human 
capabilities. As it seems, “basic personal abilities” are the concrete bodily capabilities we need to live a 
healthy life. Despite these differences, basic personal abilities and central human capabilities share 
several important similarities. In essence, both concepts encompass a set of activities we need to be 
able to do in order to pursue self-sufficiently the life we want. Moreover, both central human 
capabilities and basic personal abilities are multiply realizable: people can fulfill them in a variety of 
ways (Nussbaum 2000, 77). In parallel to Amundson, Nussbaum hopes to give people the basic 
tools they need to pursue their own conception of the good, whatever it may be, rather than to force 
people into one particular way of doing things (ibid., 86-88).30 And although both central human 
capabilities and basic personal abilities admit of a diversity of ways of being performed, they are not 
utterly inclusive. Rather, Nussbaum’s central human capabilities distinguish among levels of 
capability, and Nussbaum condemns as unjust levels of capability below a certain threshold (ibid., 6); 
similarly, Amundson’s basic personal abilities distinguish between higher and lower levels of 
functional performance, and, as we have seen, Amdunson condemns lowered levels of functional 
performance due to the fetishizing of normal modes of functioning. 
Unlike Nussbaum, however, Amundson does not mention whether there is a definite list of 
basic personal abilities, or what these basic personal abilities could be. In order to continue 
Amundson’s work, then, I hope to use Nussbaum’s central human capabilities as a template for 
constructing a comprehensive list of basic bodily capabilities. These basic bodily capabilities will serve as 
a full-bodied interpretation and enumeration of Amundson’s basic personal abilities. According to 
my Theory of Health as Capability, “health” will consist in the ability to perform certain activities 
with one’s body – i.e., the basic bodily capabilities. 
																																																								30	The capabilities approach “is focused on capability and empowerment… rather than imposing on any 
individual a required mode of functioning” (Nussbaum 2000, 302). 
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Thinking about health in terms of capability, rather than in terms of physiological states, can 
help solve many of the problems Boorse’s BST encounters when we attempt to apply it to clinical 
practice (see Chapter II above). As we have discussed, clinicians often provide treatments that aim 
to maintain and restore the contributions of our body parts and processes to biological goals more 
specific than individual S & R. For example, common treatments for tibial fracture are tailored to 
restore the tibia’s contribution to walking, rather than its contribution to individual S & R per se. By 
thinking about “health” as a definite set of capabilities, we can more easily identify the goals at 
which medical treatments should aim: in particular, medical treatments should aim at maintaining 
and restoring people’s basic bodily capabilities. 
We also noted in Chapter II above that clinicians frequently provide treatments that 
promote an unknown or poorly understood mode of physiological function. For example, 
psychiatrists prescribe lithium to treat bipolar, even though the mechanism of lithium’s action is not 
well established. From the vantage point of the BST, this kind of treatment would not be advisable: 
according to the BST, as we have seen, “health” consists in all the parts of the body making 
statistically normal contributions to S & R (Boorse 1977, 555). But for all we know, lithium could be 
promoting an utterly atypical mode of neural function. (Certainly bipolar patients who take lithium 
have a higher brain concentration of the ion than people not taking the drug.) Why would clinicians 
perform a procedure whose precise mechanism of action they do not understand? This 
phenomenon makes sense if we consider that medical treatments aim to restore people’s capabilities 
rather than any particular physiological state. Physicians would not stop prescribing lithium if new 
research established that lithium promotes an atypical style of neural function (as long as that style 
was not harmful). Lithium restores the ability of people with bipolar to do the things they need to 
do to live their lives. Thus, we can restore people’s capabilities in any of a number of ways, because 
the exact mechanism of physiological action is not always the most important aspect of a medical 
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procedure. 
Thinking about “health” in terms of basic bodily capabilities can also help us to bridge the 
gap between medical treatments and patients’ goals. As we have seen, the foremost economic 
function of healthcare is providing a service. The providers of a service should be attentive to the 
wants, needs, and values of their customers. But Boorse’s definition of health as “statistically normal 
contributions to individual S & R by all the body’s parts and processes” (ibid.) does not really 
capture patients’ goals. Many patients pursue health and healthcare services without striving for 
statistically normal physiological function; many people’s goals involve endangering their own S & 
R. Following Nussbaum, I hope to construct an account of basic bodily capabilities that make up an 
“object of overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very different comprehensive 
conceptions of the good” (Nussbaum 2000, 5). That is to say, I hope for my basic bodily capabilities 
to be general and universal enough that they can support the pursuit of nearly any conception of the 
good. By promoting bodily capabilities that support most or all people’s wants, needs, and life goals, 
healthcare can serve its customers (i.e., patients) better. In other words, by rethinking “health” as a 
set of multiply realizable basic bodily capabilities, healthcare professionals can better help their 
patients to live the lives they want to live, whatever those lives may involve. 
In addition, we pointed out in Chapter II that treatments restoring statistically normal 
function in one or a few body parts are often detrimental to the patient, especially when the patient 
has an atypical overall bodily makeup. As a fact of clinical practice, most treatments cannot fix the 
patient’s entire physiological makeup. Rather, medical treatments generally aim to change one or a 
handful of aspects of the patient’s physiology. Indeed, it might be desirable to promote the BST’s 
conception of health as full-body normality if it were medically feasible – but we do not currently have 
the technology to remodel a person’s overall physiological makeup in one fell swoop. As such, we 
should use a conception of “health” that does not necessitate any particular physiological design. 
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Our account of Health as Capability accomplishes this task. The basic bodily capabilities are multiply 
realizable: as such, they (1) provide sensible targets for healthcare practice while (2) allowing wiggle 
room for differences in body type. 
An account of “health” in terms of basic capabilities helps to accommodate another subtlety 
of clinical practice that we have not yet discussed: the cognitive limitations of healthcare providers. I 
claim that most healthcare providers, being limited by time, attention, and the bounds of human 
intelligence, cannot conceptualize whole-organismal functioning at a level of detail adequate to 
predict how particular interventions will affect individual S & R. Individual S & R is an abstract, 
high-level biological goal, and the connections between molecular and physiological occurrences and 
individual S & R are not always clear. By anchoring “health” to a concrete set of capabilities, we can 
focus treatment on a more immediate, concrete, and readily observable level in the hierarchy of 
biological goals. 
 
2. Nussbaum’s Capability Approach 
 
 As the title of the book suggests, Nussbaum’s Women and Human Development deals primarily 
with the problems of women in the developing world. As Nussbaum explains, women everywhere 
are subject to economic, social, and political inequality. But because “gender inequality is strongly 
correlated with poverty,” these inequalities are magnified in developing countries (Nussbaum 2000, 
2-3). As such, women in developing nations face an especially dire lack of opportunity: 
When poverty combines with gender inequality, the result is acute failure of central human 
capabilities. In the developing countries as a whole, there are 60% more women than men among 
illiterate adults; the female school enrollment rate even at the primary level is 13% lower than that of 
males; and female wages are only three-fourths of male wages (ibid., 3). 
 
 Thus, women in developing nations are disproportionately deprived of education and pay. 
Furthermore, they are often subject to severe political and social restrictions – e.g., reduced property 
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rights; or purdah, the imposed seclusion of women common in some predominantly Muslim and 
Hindu societies (ibid., 45-47) – as well as poor health and nutrition and pervasive sexual violence 
(ibid., 3-4). Because they so seriously lack freedom, safety, and resources, women in developing 
nations often cannot choose how they want to live, cannot pursue self-sufficiently their idea of a 
“good life.” On the contrary, they are prevented from exercising their intellectual and physical 
powers, from participating in politics, from shaping their lives to make them how they want (ibid., 
72). In short, women in the developing world “lack essential support for leading lives that are fully 
human” (ibid., 4). This notion of a fully human life is the normative kernel of Nussbaum’s capability 
approach, and I will explain it in detail shortly. 
Considering the deeply unsatisfactory situation of women in impoverished societies, 
Nussbaum proposes that we develop (1) better tools for measuring human development and (2) an 
overarching set of moral and political principles that governments can use to see that each citizen’s 
life meets some minimum standard of quality (ibid., 5-6). As Nussbaum elaborates, traditional 
measures of human development such as gross national product per capita and utility are not 
sensitive to gender inequalities. For example, a country’s GNP per capita may increase drastically, 
but this economic improvement may not concretely improve the lives of women, especially if they 
do not have property rights, educational opportunities, or reasonable access to employment (ibid., 6-
7). Measurements of utility, on the other hand, depend on the extent to which people can attain 
things they prefer more over things they prefer less; but the “apparent” or “manifest” preferences of 
women in developing countries may not accurately reflect what these women would actually prefer 
(ibid., 112-113). As Nussbaum observes, “individuals adjust their desires to the way of life they 
know” (ibid., 136); moreover, “people’s preferences are in many ways constructed by the laws and 
institutions under which they life” (ibid., 142-143). In short, toxic and repressive situations may 
deform the preferences of women in the developing world, and so the satisfaction of their apparent 
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preferences may not indicate whether their lives are actually good, or as good as they could be. 
Nussbaum provides examples of women who previously accepted marital abuse, wage 
discrimination, and other evils, but who began to fight against them after being introduced to the 
notion that these ills were a violation of rights and of justice (ibid., 112-113). In summary, then, 
existing approaches to human development do not accurately gauge the situation of women in 
developing countries. Nussbaum aims to address this problem by devising a novel set of criteria for 
measuring human development. 
More importantly than measuring social, political, and economic inequities, however, 
Nussbaum also hopes to construct a set of normative principles that we can use to combat them 
(ibid., 6). In particular, she offers “an account of basic constitutional principles” as to the minimum 
social and political abilities that governments must provide for if they are to guarantee their citizens 
fully human lives. Put differently, Nussbaum wants to put forth a normative framework that 
governments can use to write laws, discuss rights, structure governmental bodies, and set goals as to 
providing individual citizens with a minimum level of human functioning (ibid., 4-5).  
In order to solve these two problems – that of measuring gender inequality and that of 
ameliorating it – Nussbaum advocates a focus on human capabilities, that is, “what people are 
actually able to do and to be” (ibid., 5). In particular, Nussbaum identifies a list of ten central human 
capabilities – ten concrete physical, mental, social, and political abilities – that she believes are 
characteristic of, and essential to, human life as we know it (ibid., 5, 71-72). We can use this list or 
lists like it to gauge the quality of women’s lives in developing countries. For example, we may ask 
whether women in a particular country have opportunities for play, employment, self-expression, or 
social interaction (ibid., 78-80). To the extent that we can answer “yes” for each of these capabilities, 
we can say that women in the country are able to live fully human lives. Furthermore, we can use 
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities to set political goals. Nussbaum introduces the concept of a “threshold 
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level of each capability, beneath which it is held that truly human functioning is not available” (ibid., 6). 
In other words, truly human functioning requires some minimum level of ability or opportunity for 
each capability. According to Nussbaum, our political goals with respect to women in developing 
countries (or, better yet, the goals of the governments of those countries) should be ensuring that 
each individual meets or exceeds the threshold level for each capability (ibid., 5-6). 
Here is Nussbaum’s exact list of central human capabilities: 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or 
before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 
 
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately 
nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
 
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; having one’s bodily boundaries 
treated as sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure against assault, including sexual assault, child sexual 
abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters 
of reproduction. 
 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason 
– and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate 
education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific 
training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing 
self-expressive works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being 
able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to 
both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for the 
ultimate meaning in life in one’s own way. Being able to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid 
non-necessary pain. 
 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those 
who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience 
longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by 
overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect. (Supporting this capability 
means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.) 
 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience.) 
 
7. Affiliation. A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to have the capability for both justice 
and friendship. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish 
such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.) 
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified 
being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails, at a minimum, protections against 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin. 
In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into 
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meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers. 
 
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the 
world of nature. 
 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
 
10. Control over One’s Environment. A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political 
choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech 
and association. 
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not just formally but in 
terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right 
to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and 
seizure (ibid., 78-80). 
 
 There are a couple of key aspects of this list that I would like to highlight. First, it is 
immediately apparent that each of Nussbaum’s ten capabilities involves several component 
capabilities, or sub-capabilities. In fact, this list contains roughly 50 sub-capabilities.i I am not sure 
whether Nussbaum means for these precise sub-capabilities to constitute the major ten capabilities, or 
whether she means for them merely to illustrate how each of the major capabilities could be 
interpreted. For my purposes, though, the answer is not entirely important. We will be satisfied to 
notice simply that each of Nussbaum’s ten central human capabilities has complex and multiform 
foundations. In other words, the central human capabilities are not basic, unanalyzable, atomic parts 
of human nature. Rather, they are relatively high-level or apex abilities, each supported by certain 
lower-level capabilities and environmental conditions. 
Second, Nussbaum points out that the capabilities are interrelated and often partly 
dependent on one another. To illustrate, 
One of the most effective ways of promoting women’s control over the environment [#10], and 
their effective right of political participation, is to promote women’s literacy [#4]. Women who can 
seek employment outside the home [#7B, #10B] have exit options that help them protect their 
bodily integrity from assaults within it [#3] (ibid., 81). 
 
Thus, the capabilities are not mutually exclusive, but rather intricately overlapping and 
causally related. Nonetheless, Nussbaum emphasizes that we cannot compensate for a dearth in one 
capability by enhancing a different one, nor should we sacrifice one capability for the sake of 
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another. “All of [the capabilities listed] are of central importance,” she asserts, “and all are distinct in 
quality”; therefore, “we cannot satisfy the need for one of them by giving a larger amount of another 
one” (ibid., 81). In other words, each of the capabilities are uniquely valuable in themselves – their 
values are non-commensurable. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to sacrifice political 
participation for, say, increased longevity or safety. Similarly, we would be wasting our efforts if we 
tried to compensate for a lack of literacy education by increasing opportunities to play sports. 
Paradoxically, then, the central human capabilities are overlapping and interrelated, yet each uniquely 
valuable in themselves. 
Third, Nussbaum stresses that her list of capabilities is not the only such list possible. On the 
contrary, the precise list of capabilities she puts forth is simply the best list she has conceived so far 
based on her own experiences, reflections, and “cross-cultural discussion[s]” (ibid., 76). She 
encourages us to consider the list for ourselves, to test it against our beliefs and intuitions, and to 
debate it with others. “In this sense,” she affirms, “the list remains open-ended and humble; it can 
always be contested and remade” (ibid., 77). Thus, Nussbaum’s precise list of capabilities is not the 
be-all and end-all, but rather a starting point for philosophical, political, and community discourse.31  
Moreover, once we have settled upon a list of capabilities, Nussbaum envisions that we will 
need to engage in a second process of debate and reflection in order to actually implement them. 
Since “central human capabilities” are supposed to be general enough to play a central role in any 
human life, they will be too general to be justiciable or politically effective unless we provide additional 
detail as to (1) what each capability amounts to in practice, (2) what the threshold level of 																																																								31	Of course, some of the capabilities will seem “more [or less] fixed than others” (ibid., 77). In other words, 
Nussbaum predicts that the capabilities in her list will garner varying degrees of consensus. Nonetheless, she 
wagers, some of the capabilities in the list presumably will win widespread support. “… it would be 
astonishing,” she illustrates, “if the right to bodily integrity were to be removed from the list; that seems to be 
a fixed point in our considered judgments of goodness” (ibid., 77). Thus, although Nussbaum’s list of 
capabilities is flexible, it is not likely to be completely vacated upon examination; therefore, the list gives 
substantial political recommendations without being pushy. 
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performance is, (3) how exactly we should measure performance, and (4) what role government, 
corporations, and private individuals have in ensuring the capability (ibid., 77). It is not enough, in 
other words, to say merely that the government will provide for “basic mathematical and scientific 
training” (ibid., 79). Rather, we must specify who will provide the training, when they will provide it, 
who will fund it, who will receive it, what it will consist in, what it means to receive a “threshold 
level” of math and science education, etc.  
Nussbaum acknowledges that different people and societies will interpret the capabilities 
differently, depending on differences in “individual tastes, local circumstances, and traditions” (ibid., 
105). For instance, a community of Buddhist monks may interpret human affiliation and social 
interaction (see Nussbaum’s capability #7) much differently than, say, taxi drivers in Melbourne, 
rural Guatemalan villagers, or families in urban Tokyo. As such, Nussbaum leaves to individuals, 
communities, and societies to figure out how exactly to implement each capability in the list: 
… items on the list are to some extent differently constructed by different societies. Indeed, part of 
the idea of the list is its multiple realizability: its members can be more concretely specified in 
accordance with local beliefs and circumstances. It is thus designed to leave room for a reasonable 
pluralism in specification (ibid., 77). 
 
Thus, the capabilities approach is flexible and open-ended, adaptable to different cultural 
norms, material circumstances, and environments. This practical flexibility and adaptability, the so-
called “multiple realizability” of the capabilities approach, fits Nussbaum’s goal of providing 
normative principles that (a) give substantial recommendations as to how to provide people in 
developing countries with a minimum standard of living, yet (b) remain sensitive to cultural 
differences (ibid., 34-35). 
 Fourth, in the same spirit of pluralism and multiculturalism, Nussbaum points out that 
“capabilities” are opportunities to perform certain human functions – not the actual performance of 
those functions. As such, the capabilities approach seeks to provide each individual with the social, 
political, and economic foundations for truly human functioning, but it does not seek to force 
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anyone to adhere to any particular manner of functioning, nor even to take advantage of 
opportunities for functioning (ibid., 87). “Where adult citizens are concerned,” Nussbaum reiterates, 
capability, not functioning, is the appropriate political goal. This is so because of the very great importance the 
approach attaches to practical reason, as a good that both suffuses all the other functions, making 
them human rather than animal, and figures itself as a central function on the list. It is perfectly true 
that functionings, not simply capabilities, are what render a life fully human, in the sense that if there 
were no functioning of any kind in a life, we could hardly applaud it, no matter what opportunities it 
contained. Nonetheless, for political purposes it is appropriate that we shoot for capabilities, and 
those alone. Citizens must be left free to determine their own course after that. The person with 
plenty of food may always choose to fast, but there is a great difference between fasting and starving, 
and it is this difference that I wish to capture (ibid., 87). 
 
 Thus, the actual manifestation of the central human capabilities – e.g., using one’s senses and 
imagination, having loving relationships, being healthy and well nourished – is what makes a life fully 
human. Put differently, living a fully human life requires more than merely having the capability to 
function; on the contrary, it requires acting these functions out. Despite this fact, Nussbaum does 
not advocate forcing people to perform any particular function, because her approach places a 
special premium on individual choice and practical reason:32 being able to reflect on and choose our 
actions, she claims, is a key aspect of what makes a life truly human (ibid., 82-83). Accordingly, we 
do not want to tell a person that they have to eat, sleep, perform fulfilling work, spend time with 
friends, etc., if they do not want to. The best that governing bodies can do is to provide 
sociopolitical conditions that allow people opportunities to perform central human functions, and let 
people take or leave these opportunities as they see fit. 
 In order to clarify what responsibility she believes governments have in ensuring that each 
citizen meets a threshold level of capability, Nussbaum enumerates three different kinds of 
capabilities: basic capabilities, internal capabilities, and combined capabilities. Basic capabilities are the 
“innate equipment” required to perform central human functions (ibid., 84). In essence, we have 																																																								32	As I understand, Nussbaum uses the term practical reason broadly to refer to any critical reflection about 
how we should act or what kind of life we want to live (Nussbaum 2000, 79). Although Nussbaum cites 
Kant’s philosophy as an inspiration, she does not seem use the term “practical reason” in the more restricted 
Kantian sense. 
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basic capabilities for functioning simply by dint of having a working human body. These basic 
capabilities make it physically possible for us to perform human functions, either right now or 
someday in the future. “[Basic] capabilities are sometimes more or less ready to function,” 
Nussbaum expands. “The capability for seeing and hearing is usually like this. More often, however, 
they are very rudimentary, and cannot be directly converted into functioning. A newborn child has, 
in this sense, the capability for speech and language, the capability for love and gratitude, the 
capability for practical reason” (ibid., 84). Thus, having the “basic capability” for language does not 
necessarily mean that we can actually speak. It means that we have the kind of brain such that it is 
physically possible for us to speak, and moreover that we will speak given the right kinds of 
experiences – e.g., hearing others speak during our early childhood. To use a metaphor, we can think 
of basic capabilities as seeds that can grow into the ability to perform central human functions. 
Newborn humans have the basic capability for speech; rabbits do not. 
 Internal capabilities, on the other hand, are the actual physical ability to perform central human 
functions: e.g., the ability to speak if one wants to, the ability to have friends if one so chooses, the 
ability to perform work if one decides to work (ibid., 84-85). In Nussbaum’s words, internal 
capabilities are 
developed states of the person herself that are, so far as the person herself is concerned, sufficient 
conditions for the exercise of the requisite functions. Unlike the basic capabilities, these states are 
mature conditions of readiness (ibid., 84). 
 
Internal capabilities may develop from basic capabilities simply by the individual’s getting 
older. For example, people generally acquire the internal bases of reproductive functioning when 
they grow through puberty (ibid., 84). Other internal capabilities, such as the ability to express 
oneself freely in words, art, and music, may develop only by practicing the corresponding function; 
without adequate practice, the basic capability to perform these functions may not blossom into an 
internal capability (ibid., 84). 
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Combined capabilities consist of (1) the internal capability to perform a particular function and 
(2) the sociopolitical conditions necessary to perform it (ibid., 84-85). As Nussbaum illustrates, 
A woman who is not mutilated but who has been widowed as a child and is forbidden to make 
another marriage has the internal but not the combined capability for sexual expression (ibid., 85). 
 
Thus, combined capabilities require both that people are physically able to perform the 
associated functions, and that they have the social and legal ability and the economic wherewithal to 
do so. Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities is a list of combined capabilities (ibid., 85). In 
order to realize each of the central human capabilities, then, people need (1) to have had the right 
kinds of developmental experiences, and (2) to have presently the right kind of social and political 
environment (ibid., 85). According to the capabilities approach, governments have a clear 
responsibility to ensure a sociopolitical environment appropriate to the exercise of central human 
functions – for example, by passing and interpreting legislation that supports central capabilities, 
enforcing laws, providing all adult citizens the opportunity for political participation, providing 
primary and secondary education, etc. However, it is less clear what responsibility governments have 
to provide the developmental experiences necessary to turn people’s basic capabilities for 
functioning into internal capabilities. Whether people develop certain internal capabilities, 
Nussbaum notes, depends partly on natural luck (ibid., 89). For instance, some people with 
profound mental disabilities may never be able to fully exercise practical reason or literacy, no matter 
what their sociopolitical environment. Some people’s lives might get cut short by a lightning strike, a 
tornado, or a stroke. As such, governments cannot fully guarantee that each citizen has all the 
internal capabilities necessary for the exercise of central human functions. But they can guarantee 
the social bases of these internal capabilities (ibid., 89). For example, governments cannot control 
whether some people are born with dyslexia; but they can provide programs that help dyslexic 
people learn how to read better. Governments cannot control which of their citizens are artistically 
gifted; but they can provide resources, leisure time, and educational institutions that will allow 
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people to practice reading and writing literature, playing musical instruments, and making art. So 
governments have a duty to provide social, political, and economic conditions favorable to the 
exercise of central human capabilities, but they cannot guarantee on a case-by-case basis that each 
person will meet the threshold level for all capabilities. 
Fifth, although Nussbaum has built the capabilities approach with the situation of women in 
developing countries especially in mind, she means for the approach to apply to everyone. The 
capabilities approach is a universal theory of distributive justice (ibid., xiii-xiv, 7). Accordingly, 
Nussbaum hopes for her list of central capabilities to be “an object of overlapping consensus among 
people who otherwise have very different comprehensive conceptions of the good” (ibid., 5). Put 
differently, Nussbaum means to make her capabilities list such that anyone, or almost anyone, would 
value the items in it, regardless of what their overall conception of the good is like. She might hope, 
for example, that her list of capabilities could generate agreement among elderly people in retirement 
homes, coal miners, single mothers, Neo-Luddites, and professional basketball players. 
  As we have seen, Nussbaum’s claim for the universality of the capabilities approach rests 
largely on a conception that she calls “truly human life,” “fully human life,” or a life “worthy of the 
dignity of a human being” (Nussbaum 2000, 71-73). Indeed, this notion of a “truly human life” is 
the normative foundation of the capabilities approach. According to Nussbaum, the idea of truly 
human life has two main conceptual components. (1) Some functions, such as communicating with 
others through language, are so central to human life that “their presence or absence is typically 
understood to be a mark of the presence or absence of human life” (ibid., 71-72). In other words, 
these central functions are characteristic of human beings: they are what render a life human, what we 
recognize when we recognize the humanity in others. (2) Moreover, there is a “truly human,” as 
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opposed to a “merely animal,” way to perform each of these functions (ibid., 72).33 In particular, to 
perform these central functions in a human way means to perform them in “a way infused by 
practical reasoning and sociability” (ibid., 72): that is, through reflection, consideration, choice, 
cooperation, and mindfulness of others.  
In order to clarify the distinction between truly human functioning and merely animal 
functioning, Nussbaum mentions an example of Marx’s that contrasts the eating of a starving person 
with the eating of a person who is not starving. The person who is not starving can choose what she 
wants to eat, when to eat it, and who to eat it with. She can eat with manners appropriate to her 
society – e.g., in the United States, eating off of a plate, on a table, with silverware. The starving 
person, on the other hand, cannot always choose when or what to eat or who to eat with, nor does 
she always have the chance to eat in a sociable way: “… she just grabs at the good in order to 
survive, and the many social and rational ingredients of human feeding can’t make their appearance” 
(ibid., 72). What separates human functioning from animal functioning, then, is the ability to 
consider and reflect on possible courses of action, weigh them against our values and preferences, 
act according to our choices, and cooperate freely with others. Living a truly human life means being 
able to perform central human functions in this characteristically human manner.  
In the following section, I use Nussbaum’s capability approach as a template for 
constructing my account of “health.” Briefly, I believe that “health” consists in having the bodily 
capability to perform certain activities: in particular, “health” is being able to use one’s body to 
perform all the activities necessary for a truly human life. By contrast to Boorse (1977), then, my 
account of “health” is normative, since it begins with this notion of truly human life. In further 
																																																								33	Here, I mean for “animal” to refer to nonhuman animals, as Nussbaum uses the word in Women and 
Human Development. Nussbaum carries on this linguistic tic from the Marxist tradition; the word “animal,” I 
think, is supposed to evoke connotations of squalor, mindlessness, and desperation, much like that of 
chickens packed together in an industrial farm, forced to walk around in their own feces. 
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contrast to Boorse, I argue that “health” is a constellation of capabilities for action, rather than a 
physiological state. 
 
3. Health as Capability 
  
 As we have discussed, Nussbaum claims that living a truly human life involves having a 
minimum level of capability for each central human function, e.g., the ability to plan and shape our 
own lives, to use our imagination, to have friends. Along similar lines, I want to claim that “health” 
involves having a minimum level of capability for certain body-dependent activities: e.g., getting 
from one place to another, communicating with language, obtaining nourishment.  
 I think of my account of “health” as the bodily, as opposed to the sociopolitical, basis for 
the central human capabilities. According to my account, “health” is what you can do with your 
body. And what you can do with your body depends, in turn, on (1) the body itself, and (2) the 
body’s physical surroundings. As Ron Amundson points out (2000; see Chapter I, Section 3.3), what 
people can do with their bodies depends on what kinds of tools are available to them and what kinds 
of features are in their built environment (Amundson 2000, 45-48). As Amundson encapsulates 
pithily, “Given the appropriate technology and environment, blind people can read and paralyzed 
people can be mobile,” e.g., with braille and wheelchairs, respectively (ibid., 47). If “health” is what 
you can do with your body, and if what you can do with your body depends partly on your built 
environment and the technology available to you, then health must depend not only on factors 
internal to your body, but also on the devices at your disposal – wheelchairs, pacemakers, dialysis 
machines – and your surroundings – whether buildings are wheelchair-accessible, whether the air is 
clean or polluted, whether libraries have books in braille. Thus, whereas Nussbaum’s central human 
capabilities encompass many of the sociopolitical aspects of human activity – e.g., freedom of 
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speech and association, access to employment opportunities (Nussbaum 2000, 78-80) – my central 
bodily capabilities, or basic bodily capabilities, will encompass the human body and its physical 
surroundings.34 
Now that I have given a brief overview of how my account of “health” derives from and 
relates to Nussbaum’s capability approach, I will present my most current list of basic bodily 
capabilities. In parallel to Nussbaum’s capabilities list, I consider these items valuable both in 
themselves and for what they allow us to do. (Below, I will discuss how basic bodily capabilities 
contribute to higher-level conscious goals and the pursuit of comprehensive conceptions of the 
good.) Happily, this view accords with the common intuition that health is valuable both in itself 
and for what it allows us to accomplish besides. Moreover, I believe that each item on the list has 
distinctive value: as with Nussbaum’s capabilities, we cannot make up for a dearth in one basic bodily 
capability by fortifying a different one. At the same time, however – and as we shall see – these 
capabilities may overlap or contribute to one another.  
Here is the list of basic bodily capabilities that I believe are constitutive of health: 
(1) Lifespan: Being able to live a life of a normal length. 
(2) Breathing. Being able to get oxygen and expel carbon dioxide by breathing. 
(3) Nourishment: Being able to get nourishment from food and water. 
(4) Sleep: Being able to rest from sleep. 
																																																								34	We often think of healthcare as confined to what happens in hospitals, doctor’s offices, and physical 
therapy clinics. But Amundson’s observations about the inextricable connection between technology, 
environment, and capability, combined with my claim that health is capability, suggest that healthcare may be 
far more general a concern than we think. According to this view, many central aspects of health depend, in 
addition to doctors, nurses, dental hygienists, dentists, and other classical healthcare professionals, on the 
decisions of people who design technology and the built environment: politicians, architects, urban planners, 
civil engineers, ergonomics researchers, conservationists, bureaucrats, and public health officials. “Health” is 
what we can do with our bodies, but what we can do with our bodies depends, perhaps paradoxically, on 
factors far beyond the scope of our bodies. The failure to realize this fact contributes to the “hospital view” 
of healthcare mentioned in the first sentence of this footnote. 
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(5) Bodily control: Being able to control the movement of skeletal muscles; having awareness 
of body position in space. 
(6) Self-defense: Being able to defend oneself from threats, both large (e.g., tornado, bear) and 
small (e.g., virus, bacterium). 
(7) Locomotion: Being able to move from one place to another. 
(8) Sensation: Being able to sense the external environment and its effects on the body: namely, 
heat, cold, mechanical stress, pain, the presence of nearby objects, and what those nearby 
objects are doing. 
(9) Object recognition: Being able to recognize objects in environment and their spatial 
relationships. 
(10) Object relationships: Being able to recognize how objects relate to oneself and one’s 
goals. 
(11) Object manipulation: Being able to manipulate physical objects to change their position 
and orientation in space. 
(12) Humean reasoning:35 Being able to recognize patterns, reason inductively, form 
generalizations, and anticipate future events based on these generalizations. 
(13) Episodic memory: Being able to remember events, facts, people, and places. 
(14) Procedural memory: Being able to acquire new skills. 
(15) Imagination: Being able to think hypothetically about alternative states of affairs: i.e., 
things that are not yet true but could be in the future (e.g., an invention), or things that could 
never be true in fact but could be true in principle (e.g., if the laws of physics were different 
than they are, if you had played junior college baseball back in 1979). 
																																																								35	Not a typo: “Humean” means that proposed by David Hume in his “An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding” (1748). 
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(16) Planning: Being able to chart future actions according to anticipated state of affairs. 
(17) Emotion: Being able to experience a full range of human emotions. 
(18) Attachment: Being able to form attachments with other people. 
(19) Communication: Being able to communicate with other people using language. 
(20) Empathy: Being able to understand other people’s point of view. 
(21) Coordination: Being able to coordinate and sync activity with other people. 
(22) Reproduction: Being able to reproduce, if one so desires. 
(23) Motivation: Being able to want for certain states of affairs to attain, to be towards 
something.* 
(24) Coherence: Being able to act for reasons.* 
(25) Satisfaction: Being able to feel satisfied when a goal is attained.* 
 Thus, I have attempted to break Nussbaum’s central human capabilities into smaller, more 
basic bodily abilities. “Health” consists in having a threshold level of capability for each of these 25 
basic bodily capabilities. A “disease,” on the other hand, is any failure to meet the threshold level for 
one or more of these basic bodily capabilities. There are several comments I would like to make 
about the list. 
I mean for the capabilities in my list to be multiply realizable, just as are Nussbaum’s central 
human capabilities and Amundson’s basic personal abilities. That is to say, each basic bodily 
capability can be performed in one of several different ways. Following Amundson, I call these 
different ways of performing a basic bodily capability modes of function (Amundson 2000, 36). 
To illustrate a couple of different modes of function for some of the capabilities, we can 
communicate with language by speaking and listening, using sign language, or reading and writing. 
We can reproduce by having sex or by in vitro fertilization. We can sense details about our 
environment by seeing, hearing, touching, or even by feeling vibrations. We can get around by 
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walking unassisted, walking with a walker, or using a wheelchair. We can form attachments with 
other people in inconceivable many and diverse ways. We can defend ourselves from “large scale” 
threats by using judo, wielding a gun, wielding a bat, running away, hiding, or avoiding dangerous 
situations altogether. We can defend ourselves from microscopic threats by initiating an immune 
response, washing our hands, or taking antibiotic medications. Some people feel well rested after 
only six hours of sleep, whereas others need nine or ten hours.  
An individual is healthy with respect to a particular capability if she meets the threshold level 
for that capability, regardless of the mode of function she uses to meet the threshold. In other 
words, it does not matter how a person fulfills each capability – i.e., what mode of function she uses 
– as long as she meets the threshold level of capability. (I leave to healthcare institutions and members 
of society to determine what the threshold level is for each capability; see below). As such, a person 
who gets around by walking is no healthier, as far as locomotion goes, than a person who gets 
around using a wheelchair. On the other hand, a person who cannot get around self-sufficiently in 
any way is not healthy. To give another example, a deaf person who communicates via sign language 
is no less healthy, as far as communication goes, than a hearing person who talks and listens; yet a 
person that cannot use any form of language is not healthy. A person with depression who augments 
her motivation with antidepressant drugs is no less healthy, as far as motivation goes, than a person 
who is motivated without antidepressants, given that their levels of motivation are comparable. But 
a person with depression who seeks no treatment at all is not healthy, because presumably her levels 
of motivation fall below the conventional threshold. A person who senses the environment 
primarily using tactile sensation (e.g., Helen Keller) is no less healthy, as far as sensation goes, than a 
person who senses the environment primarily by seeing and hearing. But a person who cannot sense 
the environment at all is not healthy. In short, an individual’s body falls short of health when it 
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cannot perform certain characteristically human abilities. For each of these abilities, what matters is 
not the mode of function, per se, but the level of function (Amundson 2000, 48). 
Some of the items on the list appear to have more room for variety than others. For 
example, there may be an innumerable number of ways to form attachments with other people, but 
there do not seem to be as many alternative ways to breathe. Perhaps one can breathe with the 
assistance of a nebulizer, oxygenator, or iron lung. For other items yet – e.g., object recognition, 
emotion, interpersonal coordination – it seems like there could be a plethora of different modes of 
functioning, but I cannot say for certain, because we do not yet have a complete understanding of 
how the brain gives rise to mental phenomena. 
As with Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities, moreover, some of the items on the 
list “may seem to us more fixed than others” (Nussbaum 2000, 77). For example, the ability to 
breathe, and the ability to get nourishment from food and water, seem like they would be part of any 
conceivable list of basic bodily capabilities. But some people might object, for instance, that 
imagination and empathy are not part of what it means to be “healthy,” however important these 
capabilities may be. Following Nussbaum, I leave the exact list of capabilities open to debate and 
interpretation. I leave the implementation of the capabilities approach – that is, determining which 
modes of performing each capability are healthy, what is the threshold level of capability required 
for health, in what kinds of situations this threshold level applies, etc. – to healthcare institutions, 
governing bodies, and individual citizens. 
 Thus, I do not consider my list the last word on basic bodily capabilities. Rather, this list is 
simply the best that I have yet been able to come up with. The content of the list is partly contingent 
upon my own experiences regarding health and healthcare, which include (1) being a patient and 
introspecting about my own experiences; (2) observing the lives and healthcare experiences of 
friends and family; (3) reading the philosophy of medicine literature, especially on the content of the 
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terms “health” and “disease” (see, e.g., Chapters I of this thesis); (4) taking undergraduate-level 
coursework in biology, neuroscience, anthropology, cognitive science, public health, and philosophy 
of science; (4) volunteering in an emergency room for several summers; (5) shadowing physicians, 
nurses, and phlebotomists; and (6) talking about health and healthcare with medical and nursing 
students, hospital residents, and healthcare professionals.36 Ultimately, I hope for this list to spark 
debate – most immediately among philosophers, but perhaps someday among clinicians, laypersons, 
policymakers and others – about which capabilities are central parts of “health” and which are not. 
 Aside from the life experiences I have mentioned above, I have also turned to a handful of 
academic sources for guidance in constructing the list. In particular, I have read about infant 
development and the accumulation of bodily capabilities that takes place in infancy and early 
childhood (Muir and Slater 2000, Kail and Cavanaugh 2000). Infant development is especially 
informative in thinking about human capabilities because infants begin life with virtually no 
capabilities, yet over a span of a few years they develop many adult capabilities one-by-one. Because 
the acquisition of these capabilities is staggered in time – here the infant learns how to walk, there 
the infant learns how to talk – it is easier to discriminate the capabilities from one another. (Adults, 
on the other hand, often integrate their capabilities with such mastery that it is difficult to discern 
distinct capabilities.) 
 As I have discussed in the Introduction, goals and purposes have a central role in my account 
of “health.” Each individual’s goals and purposes are what ultimately endow the other items on the 
list with value. Having personal goals and projects, having ideals and values towards which one 
strives, are what make life worth living, what make anything worth doing. Since “health” is that which 
																																																								36	Special thanks to Harsha P. Jayatilake, Ali Y. Saad, Phyllis M. Boniface, David Schrock, Eli Cornblath, 
Matt Thimm, and Jennifer Feutz. 
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enables us to use our bodies to do the things we want to do, and since purposes are what make these 
activities worthwhile, purposes are what make health worth having.  
Accordingly, I have added asterisks to the final three items on the list – motivation, 
coherence, satisfaction – which I see as especially important to creating and pursuing purpose in 
one’s life. In order to have reasons for living, we first have to want or desire something. Motivation is, 
in a sense, the driving force behind purpose. For example, it would be absurd to say that learning is 
my purpose in life if I never, on any level, had wanted to learn. It would be senseless to say that 
caring for my brothers is my purpose if I had no motivation to do so.  
Coherence, as I use the term, refers to the ability to act for reasons, to act coherently. 
Satisfaction refers to feeling fulfilled, accomplished, content, or cathartic upon the achievement of 
one’s goals. In other words, it is the internal end or telos to our pursuit of goals.37 Although I do not 
understand why, it seems that anticipated psychological reward is ultimately what drives us to do 
anything. Thus, the inability to feel pleasure or satisfaction upon fulfilling our goals is a serious 
problem with health, because it erodes our motivation, thereby eroding our purposes in life, and in 
turn demolishing any reason for us to be alive and healthy in the first place.38 
These three “purpose-related capabilities,” motivation, coherence, and satisfaction, are 
perhaps the most controversial inclusions on my list of basic bodily capabilities. It may be 
counterintuitive that the ability to want, to desire, and to feel satisfied is just as much a part of “health” as 
																																																								37	Whereas the “external” telos of our goals is the fulfillment of the state of affairs or “state of the world” that 
we seek to make true – e.g., providing aid to tsunami victims, completing a public works project, having a 
happy marriage, being the richest and most feared cocaine dealer in all of LA – the “internal” telos of these 
activities is invariably some kind of satisfaction or psychological reward. This satisfaction can come with any 
of a range of emotions, from vengeance to elation to relaxation to satiation to conscientiousness to sexual 
pleasure to pious awe to arrogance to completion or finality.	38	This assertion explains why a person with depression might commit suicide. If she feels no satisfaction 
from performing activities she normally enjoys, if she gets no psychological reward from achieving her goals, 
then she loses her motivation. If she loses her motivation, then she loses her purpose, and so, by definition, 
she loses her reasons for living. This line of reasoning supports the seemingly paradoxical notion that suicide 
can be simultaneously (1) rational and (2) the result of mental illness. 
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the ability to breathe and obtain nourishment. But I hope that I have shown how these bodily 
prerequisites of purpose give meaning and value to all the other items in the list. Without reason for 
living, there is no reason why anyone would want to breathe or eat in the first place. In a manner of 
speaking, then, the axis of desire-motivation-satisfaction-purpose is the motor that pulls health 
along.  
 In the following subsection, I address advantages of using basic body capabilities as goals for 
treatment. 
 
3.1. Basic Bodily Capabilities as Targets for Treatment 
 
 As I have discussed in Chapters I and II, Christopher Boorse claims that “health” consists in 
statistically normal contributions to survival and reproduction by all the body’s parts and processes 
(Boorse 1977, 555). But individual survival and reproduction are too abstract as biological goals – 
too close to the apex in the hierarchy of biological goals, too far removed from biological goals at 
the levels of the molecular, cellular, and physiological – to provide sensible foci for medical 
treatment.  
(By the term “biological goals” I mean any goal-directed activity that is performed by, or that 
occurs within, a living organism. I borrow Boorse’s conception of goal-directedness: 
To say that an action or process A is directed to the goal G is to say not only that A is what is 
required for G, but also that within some range of environmental variation A would have been 
modified in whatever way was required for G (Boorse 1976, 78).39 
 
So biological goals include unconscious goals, such as the pancreas’s maintaining a stable level 
of blood glucose, or a bacterium’s directedness towards higher concentrations of a particular 
nutrient, as well as the conscious goals I have discussed above, e.g., striving to be the President of 																																																								39	For a more detailed explication of this definition, see Chapter I, Section 1. 
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the US. I share Boorse’s view that living organisms are “centers of activity… objectively directed at 
various goals” (ibid., 79) – in other words, that organisms consist of complex, integrated, 
multilayered, hierarchical systems of goal-directed processes.) 
Where individual S & R is too abstract to be useful in clinical practice, statistically normal 
physiology is too specific, too fine-grained (Boorse 1977, 558-561). As Amundson (2000) 
demonstrates, there are numerous different yet equally healthy ways for a person to function in the 
world. Each of these different modes of functioning involves different sets of physiological 
occurrences – e.g., using a wheelchair requires the use of different muscles and neuromuscular 
connections than does walking – and different sets of physiological makeups – e.g., deaf people who 
use sign language have different ear and brain physiology than people who speak and listen. Thus, 
Boorse’s concept of “health” as statistically normal physiology does not account for the full range of 
healthy physiological variation (see Chapter I, Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3). 
Replacing individual S & R with basic bodily capabilities solves these problems of 
organizational hierarchy. Activities such as breathing, obtaining food and nourishment, recognizing 
objects in one’s surroundings, and experiencing a full range of emotions are concrete and everyday. 
We use them frequently and centrally in our daily lives, and so they are more familiar and immediate 
than individual S & R. Moreover, it is easier to predict how changes at the physiological level will 
affect these concrete capabilities than it to predict how they will affect individual S & R. The latter 
calculation may depend on long-range interactions among physiological variables, contingent life 
events, and apparently unrelated aspects of physiology and environment. (For example, how 
accurately can we really calculate the effect of contracting strep throat on my longevity and 
reproductive chances?) The former, on the other hand, would tend to require less calculation. Bodily 
capabilities are related more directly than individual S & R to occurrences at the level of cells, 
molecules, and physiology. For example, it may be difficult to see how sleep apnea will affect my 
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survival and reproduction, but it is not difficult to see how the condition will affect my breathing 
and sleep. By making “health” a matter of contributions to basic bodily capabilities, rather than 
contributions to individual S & R, we can focus medical treatment on a level in the hierarchy of 
biological goals that is easier to think about, easier to work with, and more familiar. 
Defining “health” in terms of basic bodily capabilities also allows us to call a wider range of 
physiological makeups “healthy.” Whereas Boorse reserves the designation of “health” exclusively 
for people whose physiology falls within narrow vicinity of statistical normality, my account allows 
for a more inclusive range of healthy physiological variation. This aspect of my account 
accommodates Amundson’s intuition that different modes of functioning and different physiological 
makeups work better for different people (Amundson 2000, 50). 
Furthermore, by making “health” relative to these concrete capabilities, rather than technical 
details about physiology – e.g., “blood plasma concentration of cortisol” – we can lessen the 
exploitative potential of the intellectual monopoly that our healthcare institutions hold. One way 
that healthcare institutions could take advantage of patients (if they do not do so already) is by using 
medical jargon to restrict the awareness patients have of their own bodily conditions. Esoteric terms 
such as myocardial infarction or bilateral avascular necrosis, for example, mean nothing to laypersons. As 
such, when clinicians talk to one another with these technical terms, they shut most patients out of 
their discourse, intentionally or not. Although redefining “health” in terms of basic bodily 
capabilities will not eliminate the use of medical jargon – after all, every profession has a technical 
vocabulary – it may help combat it by encouraging talk of health in familiar terms like “breathing,” 
“eating,” “imagination,” and “ability to plan.”40 
 																																																								40	I am not advocating that healthcare professionals throw away their technical terms, or that they “dumb 
down” the technical terms of medicine to accommodate non-experts. I am advocating that clinicians add talk 
about concrete capabilities to their professional vocabulary.  
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Conclusion 
Future Directions for Research 
 
 Due to time constraints, I was not able to develop this thesis as fully as I had originally 
hoped. In this final section, I will briefly note some of the areas in which I had hoped to extend the 
capabilities approach to health. These lines of inquiry may be potential avenues for future research 
into the capabilities approach to health. 
 
1. Statistical Normality and Reference Class 
  
 In Chapter I, Section 3.1, I discussed some of the problems with the Biostatistical Theory’s 
reference classes – that is, the group of organisms to which we compare an individual when we want to 
find out whether or not it is healthy. I propose that we think about reference classes not in terms of 
whole organisms, as Boorse (1977) advocates, but rather in terms of capabilities. Each of the basic 
bodily capabilities encompasses its own set of reference classes. Each reference class for a given 
capability corresponds to a particular manner of fulfilling that capability: or, in Amundson’s words, a 
particular “mode of function” (Amundson 2000, 36).  
For example, there are several modes of performing the capability of locomotion: walking, 
using a wheelchair, walking with a cane, etc. Each of these modes of locomotion corresponds to a 
reference class. The reference class for a given mode of fulfilling a capability will encompass all and 
only those parts of the body involved in executing the capability. 
Thus, for each of the twenty-five basic bodily capabilities, each person inhabits one mode of 
function, i.e., one reference class. 
	 114 
Furthermore, we can think of each reference class as a causal-role system in the style of 
Robert Cummins (1975) – referred to colloquially as a “Cummins system.” In essence, a Cummins-
style systemic explanation diagrams how the behaviors of the individual parts of a system interact to 
produce the behavior of the system as a whole. For each of these reference classes, the parts of the 
body that contribute to a particular mode of functioning are the system parts in the Cummins 
system, and the performance of the capability is the system behavior. Defining reference classes as 
different Cummins systems that contribute to the performance of a capability lends technical 
content to Amundson’s notion of mode of function. 
In healthcare practice, I envision that clinicians would consider only a finite number of 
reference classes for each capability. As such, each patient would necessarily get “binned” or 
“pigeonholed” into one of the most common reference classes for a given capability. By 
pigeonholing people, we might overlook some of the nuanced aspects of their physiology that are 
not encompassed by any of the major reference classes for a particular capability. This perhaps non-
ideal practice is not necessary to my theory, nor is it an inevitability of healthcare, per se. But it would 
be practically useful to clinicians.  
Of course, it would be nice if we could practice individualized medicine on each patient; 
however, this vision of healthcare will not be feasible in the near future. Clinicians need to be able to 
make generalizations about modes of function so that they can make generalizations about treatment. 
Each patient isn’t a completely new and unique being with completely new treatment needs. People 
are generally similar enough, by and large, that doctors can gain wisdom and knowledge about 
treatment and generalize over populations. This generalization makes treatment way faster and more 
efficient than if each patient were a complete case study. 
 
2. Medical Necessity and Human Enhancement 
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 We can use the capability approach to health to draw principled distinctions among different 
kinds of medical treatment. Two important debates in the philosophy of medicine literature concern 
medical necessity – that is, the question of which procedures are medically necessary – and enhancements 
– that is, the question of which procedures bring the patient to above average functioning. 
 To offer a brief proposal as to how we could draw these distinctions, I would venture that 
medically necessary treatments are just those that restore a basic bodily capability that was absent or 
maintain a capability in danger of falling below the threshold level; elective treatments are those that do 
not maintain or restore a capability, but that raise some physiological process from a below-average 
level of functioning a la Boorse to an average level; enhancements are those that do not maintain or 
restore a capability, and that raise some physiological process from an average level of functioning to 
an above-average level. 
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																																																								i	Here are the 50 sub-capabilities that make up Nussbaum’s ten central human capabilities: 
1. Living life of normal length 
2. Not dying while you still realistically have life left that’s worth living 
3. Reproductive health 
4. Adequate nourishment 
5. Shelter 
6. Getting from one place to another 
7. Protecting yourself 
8. Reproductive choice 
9. Sexual satisfaction 
10. Imagination 
11. Thinking 
12. Reason 
13. Literacy education 
14. Mathematical education 
15. Scientific education 
16. Artistic self-expression 
17. Religious self-expression 
18. Musical self-expression 
19. Literary self-expression 
20. Freedom of expression (sociopolitical) 
21. Freedom of religion (sociopolitical) 
22. Pursuing meaning in life 
23. Having pleasurable experiences 
24. Avoiding non-necessary pain 
25. Ability to grieve 
26. Ability to form attachments 
27. Ability to love 
28. Ability to experience full range of human emotions 
29. Not having emotional development blighted by anxiety 
30. Forming a conception of the good 
31. Planning your own life 
32. Ability to live with others 
33. Ability to interact socially 
34. Empathy 
35. Ability to show concern for others 
36. Ability to have friends 
37. Social bases of self-respect 
38. Social bases of non-humiliation 
39. Protection from discrimination based on identity (religion, gender, race, culture, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, social class, national origin, etc.) 
40. Ability to work 
41. Ability to interact with co-workers 
42. Being able to live with other species 
43. Being able to play 
44. Political participation 
45. Free speech 
46. Free association 
47. Equal property rights 
48. Right to seek employment 
49. Equal access to employment 
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50. Freedom from unwarranted search and seizure (Nussbaum 2000, 78-80). 
